Female Chief Justices as Feminist Jurisprudential Leaders

Rosario Grimà Algora

a DPhil candidate in Law at the University of Oxford and a Stipendiary Lecturer at Wadham College.

The new Elgar Companion to Female Chief Justices in Comparative Perspective, edited by Rosalind Dixon and Erin F. Delaney, analyses the leadership of female chief justices and supreme or constitutional court presidents. Once rare, female judicial leadership has become increasingly common (p. 1), making the examination of female chief justices’ contributions to constitutional democracy, the rule of law, feminist jurisprudence and feminist institutional outcomes particularly relevant.

The book covers a wide range of jurisdictions, moving “beyond the usual suspects” (p. 31), and offers valuable insights into the complexity and richness of judicial leadership in various contexts. Some jurisdictions not covered, such as Israel and Brazil, are addressed in this symposium, creating further opportunities for her-story and her-dialogue across regions.

This post examines chief justices as potential feminist heroines. Such “heroism” may involve championing feminist jurisprudence, promoting or achieving feminist institutional reforms inside and outside the court, or adopting a different style of leadership. Given the space constraints, I mainly focus on their role as feminist jurisprudential leaders, while acknowledging that this focus offers a partial picture of feminist judicial leadership.

Many female chief justices have contributed to feminist jurisprudence. However, this has not always been the case. Some have not engaged in feminist judging (Czechia, ch 12) nor taken the lead in judgments on gender issues (South Africa, ch 26). Others have downplayed their gender in their approach to judging (Malaysia, ch 14). Overall, the chapters reveal the complexity of female judicial leadership: greater descriptive representation does not necessarily translate into substantive feminist contributions.

A particularly striking finding is that some feminist judges saw their contributions to feminist jurisprudence decline or become more limited during their presidency. This raises the question of whether reaching the top of the judicial ladder may carry unintended costs for feminist jurisprudence. The demands of judicial leadership might not always facilitate contributions to feminist jurisprudence, even when presidents identify as feminists or have previously contributed to advancing gender jurisprudence. There are several reasons that may explain this: increased administrative responsibilities, competing leadership expectations, fewer opportunities to hear cases, and the need to protect the institution against political attacks or during constitutional crises.

Salcedo, for instance, writes that although Chief Justice Sereno of the Philippines contributed to some important feminist opinions, her “limited and difficult time as chief justice resulted in a lean legacy of feminist jurisprudence” (p. 397). Her tenure was marked by former President Duterte’s war on drugs and associated human rights violations, hostility towards and within the Court, and personal attacks against her that culminated in her removal.

A revealing example of these constraints is Lady Hale’s record as president of the UK Supreme Court. Hunter and Rackley argue that although she was a prominent feminist judge, her presidency “imposed a constraint on her jurisprudential leadership, and hence potentially on her feminist influence” (p. 114). Lady Hale’s judgment writing fell from 46% to 30%, her concurrences from 16% to 5% and her dissents from 9% to 3%, although she was still more likely to sit on panels and write judgments in cases raising feminist or gender issues (p. 113 -115). They conclude that while she sought to be accessible, to collaborate and stand up for the rule of law, these commitments meant that “something had to give, and what gave were Lady Hale’s feminist judgements” (p. 127).

In three cases, Hunter and Rackley find her silence and/or absence disappointing. Where Lady Hale was not the lead judgment writer, the authors consider that even when the outcomes were feminist, “instances of feminist reasoning were relatively rare” (p. 120). Feminist jurisprudence cannot be assessed solely by judicial outcomes, but also by its reasoning. Lady Hale championed feminist reasoning in several opinions.

At the same time, the reduction in Lady Hale’s separate opinions is also a loss, given that debate and contestation are a central aspect of feminist constitutionalism. The editors acknowledge the feminist virtues of dissent but also recognise the tensions chief justices may face. They may wish to avoid being perceived as persistent dissenters, view dissent as mainly having a long-term impact, or seek to promote greater unanimity within the Court.

Promoting unanimity, collaboration and collegiality is often considered to contribute to successful institutional leadership. Several chapters link the leadership of female chief justices to greater unanimity and fewer separate opinions. At the same time, a feminist judge “allows scope for debate and contestation” (p. 16). This balance might be hard to strike in practice. Prioritising institutional consensus may sometimes limit opportunities to articulate distinctive feminist reasoning, especially regarding chief justice’s own separate opinions. Lady Hale’s presidency illustrates this challenge: during her tenure, she used her power to give voice to others by sharing leading judgments. Her court reached unanimity in 84% of its cases, more than under any previous leadership (p. 112). Her own separate opinions declined, and Hunter and Rackley suggest that, among other possible explanations, this may reflect an exercise of presidential restraint in not adding judgement simply to make a point (p. 114).

Separate opinions do not only have a long-term impact. In the short-term, they help legitimise and provide alternative interpretations and forms of reasoning, making legal academics, policymakers and journalists aware of different perspectives on constitutional decisions. Separate opinions are particularly relevant for advancing feminist legal reasoning where it has not yet become mainstream. Moving beyond the case studies of the volume, Spanish Constitutional Court judge María Luisa Balaguer, a prominent feminist, has issued over 150 separate opinions  – many criticising the absence of gender perspective (“perspectiva de género”) in the majority opinion. Some of her ideas have already been embraced in majority decisions, but even before then, they helped demonstrate that the law is not neutral, that competing interpretations exist, and that there is always room for contestation.

Formal leadership positions are therefore not necessarily the main avenue for advancing feminist jurisprudence, reasoning and contestation. In Romania, where, despite the high number of female judges, there has not yet been a female president in the Constitutional Court, Suteu examines a judge rapporteur’s contributions to feminist jurisprudence, highlighting her novel methodology and robust reasoning (ch 2). Likewise, in Germany, justices Baer and Britz have made notable contributions to gender jurisprudence. These examples serve to expand the label of “heroism” to other judges, beyond formal leadership positions.

Although this post has focused on feminist jurisprudence, the volume examines other dimensions of feminist leadership. For instance, even if Justice Maya of the South African Constitutional Court did not lead judgments on gender issues (p. 560), Albertyn and Bonthuys argue that she has “undoubtedly” played a role in the gendered transformation of the judiciary. Judge Limbach’s (Germany) leadership style and public positions were grounded in feminism, even if her contributions to feminist jurisprudence could not be distinguished within majority decisions, and she wrote very few separate opinions (ch 4).

The volume makes an important contribution to understanding the achievements of female chief justices and the complexities of this type of leadership, including due to its internal and external constraints. Yet her-story is only beginning to be told: many countries still have not had female chief justices, many need to have more, and while some who have reached top leadership positions come from modest backgrounds, several come from legal or political elites and do not always reflect the diversity of women in society.

Rosario Grimà Algora is a DPhil candidate in Law at the University of Oxford and a Stipendiary Lecturer at Wadham College. I would like to thank the Blog Team for their helpful editorial comments, especially Dr. Natalia Morales-Cerda and Dr. Saoirse Enright.

Suggested citation: Rosario Grimà Algora, ‘Female Chief Justices as Feminist Jurisprudential Leaders’, IACL-AIDC Blog (12 November 2026). https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2026-posts/2026/11/12/female-chief-justices-as-feminist-jurisprudential-leaders