Bangladesh’s Constitutional Crossroads: Reforms, Exclusion, and the Quest for Democratic Legitimacy
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Arafat Hosen Khan
CARA Visiting Senior Fellow at the LSE Law School
Introduction
Bangladesh finds itself at a critical point. The political turmoil of 2024, which ended Sheikh Hasina’s long rule and brought down the Awami League (AL) government, has ushered in a fragile era of reform under interim leader Prof. Muhammad Yunus. Yet, the nation’s journey toward democratic renewal remains full of contradictions: a legacy of economic progress that is still overshadowed by authoritarian practices, and ambitious institutional reforms that struggle due to exclusionary processes. This blog post examines Bangladesh’s ongoing challenge to balance its post-liberation ideals with modern governance realities, tracing how decades of democratic erosion led to a youth-led revolt—and why the current constitutional reform may fall into the same traps of the past unless it directly addresses the lingering issues of exclusion and centralization.
Political Context of Bangladesh: From Liberation to the 2024 Uprising
Bangladesh’s political journey since independence in 1971 has been marked by a constant struggle between democratic ambitions and authoritarian setbacks. The AL, which led the fight for liberation from Pakistan, became the country’s dominant political force, holding power under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership from 2009 onward. Her tenure saw significant economic growth, with GDP growth averaging 6% between 2010–2023, lifting 25 million out of poverty. However, these achievements were overshadowed by a steady decline in democratic freedoms. Critics argue that Hasina’s government used state institutions to tighten its grip on power, for example through the controversial Digital Security Act (2018), which was widely used to suppress dissent. The AL’s dominance also depended on weakening its rivals. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), its main opponent, was repeatedly targeted with legal action, including the imprisonment of its leader Khaleda Zia on charges widely seen as politically motivated. Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, was banned in 2013 through a highly contested court ruling, further eroding political diversity. Meanwhile, Hasina’s government was accused of manipulating the judiciary and electoral apparatus, turning them into tools of executive control.
In late June 2024, Bangladesh’s quota reform movement gained momentum as university students protested a government job reservation system they saw as favoring the descendants of freedom fighters at the expense of meritocracy. The movement became a rallying point for broader frustrations over economic inequality and the Hasina government’s authoritarianism. By early July peaceful demonstrations had descended into chaos: over 1,000 protesters were reportedly killed or injured, dozens of police officers lost their lives, and public infrastructure suffered severe damage. The government responded with curfews, internet blackouts, and the use of lethal force, further inflaming tensions. Hasina eventually resigned under military mediation, making way for an interim government led by Prof. Muhammad Yunus, the microfinance pioneer and Nobel laureate, who promised to “reboot democracy” through constitutional reforms.
This dramatic shift, however, left the country deeply divided. The AL’s sudden downfall created a leadership vacuum, while the BNP, weakened by years of suppression, struggled to redefine its role. Yunus’ interim administration, initially welcomed as a neutral and pragmatic alternative, soon faced doubts about its legitimacy and ability to navigate Bangladesh’s deeply entrenched networks of political favoritism. The Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC), established by the interim government in late 2024 and charged with drafting a new framework for governance, now faces a critical challenge: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without repeating the same exclusionary practices that have fueled past crises.
The 2025 CRC Report
The CRC has put forward bold reforms in a report submitted to the interim government on 15 January 2025. The proposed reforms are intended to break down Bangladesh’s centralized power structures and strengthen democratic accountability, and include:
the creation of a series of guarantor institutions, and a National Constitutional Council as a meta-guarantor institution;
the restructuring of the legislature from a parliamentary to a semi-parliamentary moderated system;
the introduction of presidential and prime ministerial term limits;
judicial decentralization;
the expansion of rights protections to include protections for socio-economic rights; and
electoral system reform designed to promote democratic inclusion.
While the CRC’s vision is ambitious, its decision to exclude major political stakeholders in developing these reform proposals—including the AL, key minority groups, and even the BNP to certain extent—has faced backlash for mirroring the same elite-driven approach it aims to reform.
The Marginalization of Political Stakeholders
Research on building constitutions through consensus highlights the risks of the CRC’s exclusionary approach. In The Endurance of National Constitutions, Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton argue that constitutions shaped through broad stakeholder compromise—like South Africa’s 1996 post-apartheid Constitution—tend to be more stable and effective. On the other hand, reforms forced through without political agreement, such as Myanmar’s 2008 military-drafted charter, often struggle with enforcement and public resistance. The CRC’s decision to leave out major political parties and minority groups creates a dangerous gap, where even well-intentioned reforms could be exploited by future regimes or struck down by the courts. A stark example is Nepal’s 2015 Constitution, which was drafted without proper representation of Madhesi and Tharu communities, leading to violent protests and lasting instability. In Bangladesh, a lack of AL participation in the CRC’s deliberations—despite the party representing over 35% of the electorate—raises serious concerns about the long-term viability of these reforms. Without a framework to bring these stakeholders into the process—as seen in Colombia’s 2016 peace accord, which relied on multi-tiered dialogues to ensure broad participation—the CRC’s proposals risk becoming yet another short-lived democratic experiment in Bangladesh’s political history.
While the CRC’s proposals to decentralize power and expand socio-economic rights are commendable, its decision to exclude most of Bangladesh’s key political parties from the constitutional review process shows a clear disconnect from the country’s political reality. Even in its weakened state after 2024, the AL’s legacy as both a liberation movement and the penultimate ruling dispensation, along with its grassroots networks, makes it a crucial player in any constitutional agreement. By sidelining the AL, as well as other key political forces such as BNP, the Jatiya Party, Jamaat-e-Islami to some extent, and other smaller parties, the CRC not only alienates their supporters but also risks pushing forward reforms that lack broad consensus in the political establishment—a mistake similar to Sri Lanka’s 1972 Constitution, which collapsed due to the exclusion of Tamil minorities and the dominance of Sinhala elites. Amal Sethi’s equitable elite bargaining theory explains why the exclusion of the political elites from the reform process is a recipe for continued constitutional instability.
The CRC’s blind spot extends not only to political parties but also to minority communities—religious groups like Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians, as well as ethnic minorities such as the Chakma people and the Garo people, and linguistic minorities such as Urdu-speaking Biharis—whose exclusion contradicts the report’s stated commitment to pluralism. Bangladesh’s 1972 Constitution, despite its secular foundation, has long struggled to balance its Bengali-nationalist identity with the rights of non-Bengali communities. The CRC’s failure to engage these groups echoes the missteps of Egypt’s 2014 constitutional process, where Coptic Christians and secular activists were shut out in favor of Islamist-military negotiations, resulting in a Constitution widely seen as illegitimate.
The CRC’s technocratic focus on institutional changes overlooks the crucial need for dialogue across Bangladesh’s deeply divided political and ethnic landscape. Even if the proposed changes themselves are welcome, a consultative process could improve upon the design, or at least secure the buy-in of political elites who would be tasked with working within these new frameworks, and minority groups who would be most affected by them.
Path Forward: Inclusivity as a Democratic Imperative
For Bangladesh’s constitutional reforms to move beyond political instability and gain lasting public trust, the interim government must address the deep-seated exclusions that will weaken the CRC Report’s vision. Key strategies—drawn from global experiences in constitutional reform and transitional justice—are essential to closing these gaps:
Political Stakeholder Inclusion: Mediating Rivalry Through Structured Dialogue
The exclusion of the AL from the CRC’s deliberations raises serious concerns about whether the reforms can gain political acceptance. As noted above, despite their complex and often controversial past, the AL maintains strong grassroots support and deep institutional influence—factors that any constitutional reform must take into account. South African scholar Fanie du Toit emphasizes that post-conflict societies need “structured dialogue” to turn into partners in governance. Taking inspiration from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Bangladesh could create a National Dialogue Forum (NDF). This platform would bring together AL representatives, leaders from other political parties, civil society, and youth activists to engage in mediated discussions on past grievances. By ensuring that all factions have a stake in the reform process and establishing neutral enforcement mechanisms, the NDF could help build the political consensus necessary for lasting constitutional change.
Minority Representation: From Tokenism to Participatory Legitimacy
The CRC’s emphasis on “pluralism” lacks real meaning unless it actively includes minority voices in governance. Indigenous communities , religious minorities, and linguistic minorities make up nearly 15% of Bangladesh’s population, yet they continue to be politically sidelined. For the reform process to be truly inclusive, the CRC must ensure these communities have a say in shaping the country’s future.
Conclusion
The bold proposals in the CRC’s 2025 Report have the potential to usher in a new democratic era. However, the success of any reforms depends on the ability of constitution-makers to navigate Bangladesh’s complex socio-political landscape. The country’s political history has been a continuous struggle between centralized authority and grassroots democratic movements, deeply influenced by the dominance of the AL and BNP, debates over secularism, and the systemic marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities.
Sustainable constitutional reform is not just about adjusting institutions—it requires a deeper transformation in how power is distributed and negotiated. Excluding major political forces ignores a crucial truth: no constitutional framework can succeed without the support of those who shape the political landscape. Unless these divides are addressed, the reforms risk repeating the very same exclusionary politics they aim to dismantle.
The interim government under Prof. Yunus stands at a defining moment. It can either continue the cycle of top-down constitutional changes that have historically led to political instability and public disillusionment, or it can break new ground by fostering genuine democratic participation. The latter path demands bold action: reopening dialogue to include all major political factions, and guaranteeing legislative representation for marginalized groups. If these steps are ignored, the CRC Report risks becoming yet another well-meaning reform proposal that ultimately fails to bring democratic stability to Bangladesh.
Arafat Hosen Khan is a CARA Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Law School, and previously served as a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Law at North South University, Dhaka.
Suggested citation: Arafat Hosen Khan, ‘Bangladesh’s Constitutional Crossroads: Reforms, Exclusion, and the Quest for Democratic Legitimacy’ IACL-AIDC Blog (27 March 2025) Bangladesh’s Constitutional Crossroads: Reforms, Exclusion, and the Quest for Democratic Legitimacy — IACL-IADC Blog
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