Opposition Alliance in Turkey: Can it Restore Democracy?

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Başak Ekinci

Istanbul Bilgi University

In 2017, Turkey shifted to a “Turkish-style” presidential regime in which a lack of checks and balances has enabled power to be consolidated in the executive. Notwithstanding the long-term experience of a parliamentary system, the choice of this atypical presidential regime was no surprise. The Justice and Development Party (hereinafter “AKP”) had been in power since 2002; Erdogan became the first elected President in 2014 following a constitutional amendment; and since then, he had enjoyed de facto control both over the legislature and the executive as the President who was the founding leader of the ruling AKP. Moreover, the de facto power of Erdogan effortlessly exceeded the constitutional limits with the declaration of the state of emergency following the failed coup of 15 July 2016. 

The amendment that introduced the presidential regime was adopted and submitted to a national referendum in a political atmosphere where many civil society organisations were shut down; tens of thousands of people were dismissed from public service; many elected mayors were replaced by trustees; and many Parliament members were prosecuted and arrested. In this context, the change in the government system was not a simple political choice, but an attempt to institutionalise the ongoing unconstitutional consolidation of power.

While the opposition stayed ineffective in the meantime, the economic collapse caused by the instability of the presidential regime created an opportunity for them: Now they claim that neither the presidential regime nor President Erdogan’s economic policy works, and that they will fix the economy once in power. To this end, six opposition parties gathered to work on the design of a strengthened parliamentary system project. Their aim is to shift back to a parliamentary system and recover the economy by removing the traces of Erdogan’s governance. However, while the opposition revives, an important question remains: Can the roundtable work of the opposition alliance (hereinafter “the alliance”) help make Turkey’s return to democracy a success? In this post, I argue that the alliance lacks a democratic approach and thus cannot contribute to restoring democracy with their current approach. To do so, I first outline the structure and the aim of the alliance, and then point out the institutional limits that might obstruct the alliance. 

The Alliance

The alliance consists of six parties, three of which are new parties that dissociated from AKP and its ally Nationalist Movement Party (hereinafter “MHP”); two are strongly conservative parties. In this respect, the alliance seems like a replication of the ruling coalition of AKP and MHP. The alliance also appears to be exclusionary given that it only includes six parties out of 123 registered political parties in total inside and outside the Parliament. The fact that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (hereinafter “HDP”) and the Workers’ Party of Turkey, respectively the second and the fourth largest opposition parties in the Parliament, are not involved in the alliance further reveals how limited it is.

Moreover, the alliance’s focus is very narrow in that it only focuses on the government system, but not the authoritarian regime itself. This is perhaps because an alliance can only be around a minimum common agenda and suggesting more may result in failure in the next elections. However, the needs in terms of the government system can only be determined and met considering the conditions brought and maintained the authoritarian regime. To do so, the political interests of all segments of society should be included in the work. Otherwise, the alliance’s efforts can only promise hope for the change in the government, but not necessarily for restoring democracy.

Institutional Obstacles

If the alliance sees the parliamentary system as a sine qua non for the restoration of democracy, we must dwell on the question of how to return to it. One choice could be making a new constitution just as Márki-Zay in Hungary promised to do so if elected. Considering that adopting a new constitution has never been off the agenda in Turkey, it would not be surprising if this option was chosen, but it would not be wise either. Since the ruling coalition also has a draft constitution at hand, the alliance’s promise of a new constitution entails a risk to reduce the constitution to a mere campaign tool in the electoral competition. Also, the alliance’s exclusionary constitution-making process cannot be regarded as democratic while ignoring the other political parties, working behind closed doors, and not consulting public opinion.

As to amending the Constitution to transform Turkey into a parliamentary regime, defeating the ruling coalition in the elections is not sufficient. Article 175 of the Constitution requires at least one-third of the total number of the Parliament members’ written proposal and a three-fifths majority of the total number of the members for the adoption of a bill for an amendment. The amendment rule stipulates that the law amending the Constitution must be adopted by at least a three-fifths of the members, but in the case that it is adopted by a three-fifths or less than two-thirds majority of the total number the law must be submitted to a referendum by the President. These are difficult conditions to be met. Therefore, given the unlikelihood that the alliance will be able to garner the required super majorities in the Parliament to facilitate amendment, the question is whether the alliance is only committed to the parliamentary system as an electoral promise or whether it is prepared to face these institutional obstacles as well?

Conclusion

With the exclusionary approach of the alliance and the institutional obstacles to fulfil its promise in mind, the opposition’s work on the parliamentary system seems to be unable to go beyond a campaign pledge. However, besides that, the alliance’s election-oriented approach is thought-provoking in terms of Turkey’s political culture in which the elected officials assume that they—as the delegates of the nations—can govern at their sole discretion. The alliance promises to recover the economy and save the republic with the shift back to a parliamentary system just as AKP claimed it would overcome the economic crisis and bring development to the country in the 2002 election, which ended up with its victory. Erdogan’s saviour positioning ensured victories in successive elections and eventually enabled him to “govern as he sees fit” first within the constitutional constraints, then within the bended limitations, which are also determined as he sees fit.

In a setting where the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention is into force, LGBTI+ people are targeted, human rights defenders and members of political parties are arrested with political motives, the indictment demanding the dissolution of HDP is accepted, the restoration of democracy cannot be reduced to the matter of economic recovery and the system of government. The latter cannot be a cure-all when elected officials keep governing as they see fit. While the alliance’s current exclusionary/undemocratic approach in its effort to restore democracy contradicts with the aim it aspires to reach, the institutional obstacles raise concern that the alliance’s endeavour is limited with the electoral competition. Therefore, the current work of the alliance remains weak in terms of a democratic approach, and it needs an inclusive formation with a concrete (and constitutional) plan for the restoration of democracy.

Başak Ekinci is a research assistant at Istanbul Bilgi University Faculty of Law

Suggested Citation: Başak Ekinci, ‘Opposition Alliance in Turkey: Can it Restore Democracy?’ IACL-AIDC Blog (22 February 2022) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/2/22/opposition-alliance-in-turkey-can-it-restore-democracy.