The Lot against the Government? Italy’s Judicial Referendum and its Aftermath

Petra Malfertheiner and Francisco Javier Romero Caro

Petra Malfertheiner and Francisco Javier Romero Caro are researchers at the Institute for Comparative Federalism at Eurac Research in Bolzano/Bozen

The defeat suffered by Italy’s ruling coalition in the constitutional referendum on the judicial reform held on 22 and 23 March 2026 constituted a significant blow to PM Giorgia Meloni. In the days preceding the referendum, polling data suggested a relatively narrow margin between the competing options, and prevailing expectations held that higher voter turnout would favour the “yes” camp. Both assumptions, however, were contradicted by the outcome. This unexpected result, coupled with the higher-than-expected turnout, calls into question the apparent stability of the ruling coalition and raises doubts about Meloni’s political prospects. More broadly, it reflects a wider EU pattern, where constitutional reforms affecting the judiciary have become politicised, as seen in Poland and Hungary, often heightening executive-judiciary tensions and concerns over the undermining of judicial independence and the rule of law.

From reform to rejection

The judicial reform has long been a recurring issue in Italian politics. However, the reform promoted by Meloni’s executive can be considered a posthumous realization of Silvio Berlusconi’s dream, as it would have settled the score with a judiciary that he always considered hostile and politically biased. Unlike the most recent judicial reform, the 2022 Cartabia reform (adopted through ordinary legislation), the government opted to articulate it via a constitutional reform amending seven articles of the Italian Constitution.

The reform revolved around four main issues. First, it envisaged the constitutional separation of the careers of judges and public prosecutors, who currently belong to the same judicial corps, moving Italy towards a model prevailing in most European countries. This proposal addressed a limited phenomenon, as only one transition per judicial career is allowed and just 0,5% of magistrates switch functions.

Second, the reform proposed the division of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the governing body of the judiciary, into two distinct bodies, i.e. a judicial CSM and a prosecutorial CSM, each responsible for the career management of its respective members. Third, the reform would have replaced the existing system for electing members of the CSM with a mechanism based on random selection following two distinct procedures. Lay members, who constitute one third of the body, would have been drawn by lot from a list compiled by Parliament consisting of university professors of law and lawyers with at least fifteen years of professional experience. The remaining two thirds, composed of judicial members, would likewise have been selected by lot from among judges and prosecutors respectively. Finally, the reform provided for the creation of a High Disciplinary Court empowered with disciplinary jurisdiction over magistrates, thereby removing this function from the CSM.

The legislative process was marked by its speed as all amendments were rejected, including those proposed by the members of the governing majority. It was also characterized by its lack of exhaustiveness, as several important details such as the lengths of the lists and the selection process or the specific provisions concerning the system of judicial bilingualism applicable in South Tyrol remained undefined. Also, the reform did not directly address long-standing and pressing problems of the judiciary, such as shortages of staff and the excessive length of processes, thereby creating the impression that it focused primarily on politically sensitive matters and overly technical aspects of judicial governance. Since the reform failed to reach the two-thirds majority required in the second reading in each chamber, a confirmatory constitutional referendum was triggered (art. 138 itConst), which the executive framed as an opportunity to consolidate its political position.

Referendums are a common practice in Italy, with 36 held since 2000. Yet, constitutional referendums are rare, with this being only the fifth since the creation of the Republic in 1946. This raised the salience of the vote, contributing to the politicisation of the campaign and turning it into a referendum on the government more than on the substantive (and too technical) issue itself. This dynamic entailed an important risk for Meloni, especially in light of previous experience.

In 2016, then PM Matteo Renzi pushed a constitutional reform that would have substantially altered the country’s bicameral system and territorial organization. Renzi explicitly tied his political future to the referendum, which became a vote on his leadership and ended in a decisive defeat, leading to his resignation. Although Meloni avoided explicitly linking her political future to the outcome of the referendum, the increased prominence of the issue nevertheless politicised the vote and exposed the government’s limits in preventing it.

The referendum saw an unexpectedly high turnout (55,69%) driven by younger and urban voters. This is notable given that Italy is one of the few EU countries that does not allow for mail voting. Moreover, unlike abrogative referendums, which are subject to a turnout quorum and thus often invalidated due to low participation, constitutional referendums are not subject to such a requirement. The “no” prevailed with 53,24% of the vote, compared to 46,76% of the “yes”, despite the latter having led (at times even comfortably) in opinion polls until a few weeks before the vote. At the regional level, only three out of twenty regions, Lombardy, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, all northern regions governed by right-wing parties, voted in favor of the reform, while the southern regions strongly opposed it. The urban-rural divide was also striking with all major cities voting overwhelmingly for the “no”.

A defeat with profound consequences?

A variety of factors contributed, to different degrees, to the government's defeat. The attempt to reform the Constitution was perceived by various sectors as an attack on the separation of powers. Considering that Brothers of Italy is a party whose democratic credentials have been the subject of debate and that the judiciary is among the most highly trusted institutions in Italy, the reform was interpreted by some as indicative of democratic backsliding. In addition, Meloni’s limited success in delivering on key promises, e.g. in migration control or fiscal policy, may also have had a penalizing effect in the current political context.

The electoral rejection of the judicial reform thus marks another major setback to the government’s broader reformist agenda. It has failed in all three major reforms that it has attempted so far. The so-called “differentiated autonomy”, a reform that aimed at increasing the powers of ordinary regions, has been shelved after being partially struck down by the Constitutional Court. The third major reform, often defined as the “Mother of all reforms” by PM Meloni, is the Premierato, which seeks to introduce the direct election of the Prime Minister, and effectively transform Italy from a parliamentary republic into a semi-presidential system. However, given the limited time remaining in the term and the government’s defeat in the recent referendum, it now appears very unlikely to be approved, leaving the government with little achievements in relation to its initially promised ambitions. In fact, after three and a half years in power, Meloni’s record has largely consisted of maintaining macroeconomic stability, riding the tailwind of Draghi’s reforms and the windfall from the EU Resilience and Recovery fund, and the absence of major government crises. However, even this relative stability seems increasingly uncertain. In the aftermath of the referendum, the government entered a phase of damage control, prompting the resignation of the chief of staff of the Minister of Justice and the Vice Minister of Justice. Meloni also urged the Minister of Tourism to resign (Italian PMs lack the formal power to dismiss ministers), as the minister had been involved in several scandals. Ultimately, she stepped down after several hours of political standoff.

The public backlash against the government has left it in a precarious position with approximately a year and a half remaining in its term. It remains difficult to predict whether the governing parties will be able to rebuild their rapport with the Italian electorate, or whether this moment represents a point of no return. The government’s response in Parliament has been clear: the strategy is to accelerate discussions on reforming the electoral law, potentially tailoring it to the strategic interests of the governing coalition, and in view of early elections that might take place sooner than expected.

The referendum may serve as a catalyst for the consolidation of the “campo largo”, a broad centre-left coalition project that emerged during the campaign of the referendum and brings together the Democratic Party, the Five Star Movement and the Greens and Left Alliance as a potential governing alternative. In any case, opposition parties should also exercise caution, as the politicisation of the referendum, combined with the fact that the reform targeted one of Italy’s most trusted institutions, may not automatically translate into a stable or cohesive alternative majority.

Francisco Javier Romero Caro and Petra Malfertheiner are researchers at the Institute for Comparative Federalism at Eurac Research in Bolzano/Bozen