Putin’s Constitutional Manifesto: Sovereignty, Primacy, Survival

Paul Fisher

University College London

It is over three years since President Putin’s poslanie of 15 January 2020, where, in an address to both chambers of the Federal Assembly, he initiated a series of amendments to the Russian Constitution. A great many things have happened since then (including the invasion of Ukraine) which may not have occurred but for the strengthening of authoritarianism in Russia, which has been buttressed in part by those constitutional amendments and the security afforded to Putin as Head of State in principle until 2036. 

Why would a non-democrat in Putin’s shoes embark upon the process of constitutional amendment and have those proposals rubber-stamped in a popular vote? That is the focus of this article, which considers the unique strategic utility of constitutional amendment to non-democrats when addressing threats to the longevity of their leadership. 

Part of the answer to that question lies in what I call the ‘Constitutional Manifesto’: an opportunity afforded by the act of amendment to justify not only the constitutional amendments themselves, but also to justify and legitimise a non-democrat’s continued leadership. Putin’s Constitutional Manifesto was, in part, set out in his poslanie of January 2020, which identified the key themes of his fourth term in office: territorial sovereignty, the primacy of Russian jurisprudence and the survival of the Russian state, its values and culture. 

Why Constitutional Amendment in Non-Democracies?

If constitutions are not worth the paper they are written on in non-democracies (as some claim), why do non-democrats embark upon constitutional amendment at all? One response might be that if a non-democratic leader needs to avoid term limits imposed by the constitution, then a constitutional amendment is required. However, there are alternatives to directly amending constitutional term limits that allow non-democrats to by-pass them. This is the subject of a paper by Mila Versteeg et al, which considers the various methods used to avoid presidential term limits. Putin utilised one to his advantage in 2008-2012. He placed Dmitry Medvedev into the presidency to keep the seat warm until his return after a single term as prime minister. Versteeg et al refer to this as the ‘faithful agent’ strategy. 

The so-called Medvedev-Putin ‘tandem’ proves that formal constitutional amendment is not always necessary to avoid term limits. In addition, constitutional amendment potentially exposes non-democrats to certain risks: the need to co-opt the legislature, elite networks and the judiciary; and the need to secure a convincing outcome in national plebiscites without the vote appearing to be too stage-managed. A national vote that lacks domestic credibility will undermine the whole purpose of plebiscitary democracy, which is to prove that a leader’s proposals are approved by the vast majority of the population.

In answering the question why non-democrats turn to constitutional amendment to address threats to the longevity of their leadership, we may find some utility in considering Putin’s poslanie of January 2020. 

The Poslanie

Any observer of Russian politics will understand that the most likely motivation for constitutional amendment in 2020 was the fact that Putin was faced with a threat to his longevity in the form of the consecutive two-term limit imposed by the (unamended) Article 81(3) of the 1993 Constitution. A Russian President could not serve more than two terms. Putin’s fourth term as President would be coming to an end in 2024, giving rise to what many referred to as the ‘2024 problem’. But unsurprisingly, the 2024 problem was not raised at all in Putin’s speech. 

In Putin’s case, the Tereshkova Amendment (introduced by a member of the State Duma) meant that Presidents could not serve for more than two terms in total (rather than just consecutively), but disapplied these provisions to former Presidents. This meant that Putin could in principle stand for re-election in 2024 and 2030 for two more 6-year terms despite having 20 years as President under his belt.

Instead of the threats posed to his leadership, Putin’s focus in the poslanie was on the survival of the Russian Federation. Putin identified several key themes. He first focused on the threats of Russia’s past. He emphasised the internal chaos of Russia’s lost decade in the 1990s: the oligarchs and “international terrorism” in the north Caucasus undermined the Russian state, he claimed. He asserted that those threats had been dealt with under his leadership. Second, he turned to what he understood to be future threats posed to Russia by international organisations and the fact that Russia could only continue to exist if it maintained its sovereignty in the face of them. As I have considered in a separate article, one of his answers to this external threat was giving priority to the Russian constitution over norms of international law. His emphasis throughout the speech was on the territorial sovereignty of the Russian Federation, the primacy of its laws, values and culture as well as the survival of the Russian state. 

This is how Putin has come to characterise the purpose of his regime: to protect Russia against the external threats posed to its  territorial integrity and constitutional sovereignty. This public justification for his regime may not have started with the poslanie of 2020 but it was certainly reiterated then as the purpose of both constitutional reform as well as his continued leadership. 

Putin presented himself as an observer of the process of constitutional change, rather than its prime instigator, and made certain proposals that might be considered as part of the process of amendment. But it is clear that in reality he was seeking to identify himself with certain themes that he considered were popular with the public at large. He was setting out the key parameters of any future amendments: these parameters were defined by the alleged existentialism of Russia’s battle with the West and the need to preserve Russia’s sovereignty at all costs. He emphasised that whatever the outcome of reform, it was necessary that Russia remain a “strong, presidential republic”. Putin then held a nationwide vote over the course of five days in the lead-up to 1 July 2020, which addressed many of the cultural and political themes critical to his support base: Russia’s orthodox heritage, the historical Christian ancestry of the Russian state and ‘traditional’ family values. This facilitated something that Paul Goode has appositely referred to as “patriotic legitimation”. Putin was, therefore, able to use the act of initiating constitutional amendment as a platform for populist themes that would become enshrined within the architecture of the amended constitution. 

Authoritarian Learning

It is not just Putin who has utilised a moment of reform to publicise his constitutional manifesto. The reforms of 2020 are merely a window through which we can see repeated practice among other non-democrats. In a process some have referred to as “authoritarian learning”, non-democrats can study and learn from one another’s past practice. Soon after Putin’s reforms, President Lukashenka of Belarus followed suit. Extensive protests in Belarus following the controversial presidential election of August 2020 led him to initiate constitutional amendments. He used a platform before the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in February 2021 to outline the rationale for the amendments: the protesters were characterised as anarchists who would relish the prospect of state capture for their own benefit, serving as a bridgehead for foreign powers. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Lukashenka also asserted the need for Belarus to remain a strong presidential republic, mimicking almost word-for-word Putin’s message just over 12 months earlier.

The Constitutional Manifesto

The ‘Constitutional Manifesto’ allows non-democratic leaders to set out their justifications not only for the constitutional amendments but for the continuation of their leadership. Just like an electoral manifesto, it is a way for the leadership to set out its stall. Yet it allows them to do so without the risks associated with elections – even elections lacking true competition. These are not options available to the non-democrat who simply uses the “faithful agent” strategy or its alternatives: in that case, there is no grand-standing opportunity to set out an alternative program for development and no defined theme that comes from a great ‘reforming’ act.

The idea of a manifesto that focusses on constitutional ideas is not new: Richard Parker’s “constitutional populist manifesto” describes constitutional documents as an opportunity not necessarily to constrain government but to express populist platforms. Anthony Horvath has also referred to the “constitutionalist manifesto” in his study of the gradual break down of US constitutionalist order. 

The notion of the Constitutional Manifesto that I have proposed in this article is very different from either of the abovementioned concepts. It recognises that part of the purpose and motivation of constitutional reform in non-democracies is that the act of initiation is intended to be a manifesto for consumption by certain audiences, justifying both the amendment process itself but also the continued leadership of the non-democrat which the amendment is designed to secure. For the Russian President, the process of amendment allowed him to set out his agenda for and justification of 16 more years in the Kremlin: namely the Russian Federation’s sovereignty, primacy and survival.

Paul Fisher is a practising lawyer and PhD researcher at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies. His research is funded by an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) grant offered through the UCL, Bloomsbury and East London ("UBEL") ESRC Doctoral Training Partnership

Suggested Citation: Paul Fisher, ‘Putin’s Constitutional Manifesto: Sovereignty, Primacy, Survival’ IACL-AIDC Blog (14 February 2023) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2023-posts/2023/2/14/putins-constitutional-manifesto-sovereignty-primacy-survival.