Regulating Foreign Interference Without Undermining Democracy: Lessons from the Venice Commission

Maxim Krupskiy

PhD, Human Rights Attorney-at-Law and Research Scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Foreign Interference: A Contemporary Challenge to Democracy

In recent years, legal proposals to counter foreign interference have been increasingly discussed by European and international actors. In December 2023 the European Commission adopted a Defence of Democracy package, the central piece of which is a proposal intended “to shed light on covert foreign influence”. In April 2025 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 2593 (2025) in which it noted that “intentional, covert and manipulative interference by foreign powers, their proxies or private actors jeopardizes security, democratic values and governance across Europe.” In March 2026, the Venice Commission endorsed the Secretariat Memorandum Comments to PACE Recommendation 2301(2026) on “Elections in times of crisis.” The Commission supported PACE's position on the need for democratic forces to cooperate in countering foreign threats  and noted that it “aims to further contribute to this effort through its forthcoming report on foreign influence and interference, drawing on good practices in the legislation of its member states, and the development of guidelines on human rights-compliant legislation regarding foreign influence and interference.” Given the hybrid nature of threats of foreign interference, many lawmakers today seek to create a universal legal response mechanism, typically characterized by broad discretion and taking the form of legislation on transparency of foreign influence—in particular, “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, in light of the Venice Commission’s recommendations discussed below, a more effective approach might be for democracies to regulate specific forms of harmful foreign interference rather than rely on broad “foreign agent” regimes.

Non-Interference as a Pretext for Illiberal Legal Initiatives

Since the 2010s the topic of non-interference has been actively exploited by illiberal actors, by introducing legislation ostensibly aimed at tackling foreign interference. Many of these initiatives have been subject to review by the Venice Commission over the past decade. In particular, the Commission has prepared opinions on such initiatives from Russia (2014, 2021), Kyrgyzstan (2013, 2024), Hungary (2017, 2024), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023), Georgia (2024, 2025) and Slovakia (2025). Such initiatives are promoted as the equivalent of the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 under the pretext of ensuring transparency of covert foreign influence. They involve a new legal status—“foreign agent” or its analogues — which would be applied to persons deemed by the authorities to be promoting foreign interests. These initiatives primarily target civil society actors—especially non-profit organizations receiving foreign funding and independent media - and typically impose a range of additional burdensome reporting obligations on such persons, require them to label all relevant informational materials with the designation “foreign agent origin” or its equivalent, and provide for severe penalties for noncompliance, including criminal liability.

All of these initiatives have been subject to significant criticism from the Venice Commission mainly for failed compliance with the conditions of legality, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. “The condition of legality is met when the restriction has a legal basis, which is precise, certain and foreseeable. Under the condition of legitimacy, restrictions need to pursue one of the legitimate aims indicated in the relevant instruments. Under the condition of necessity/proportionality, restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society to achieve the legitimate aim and they also have to be proportionate to that aim. All the three conditions need to be met cumulatively.”

The main pitfalls of the aforementioned initiatives, which, according to the Commission, fail to fully meet the condition of legality, are excessive discretion of the state organs and extremely vague legislative terms such as, for example, “political activities.” Such labels as “foreign agent,” “organizations pursuing a foreign interest,” “agents of foreign influence”- regardless of the political or historical context - are stigmatizing in nature and inevitably create an atmosphere of mistrust around the designated person. These labels, as well as requirements for labeling informational materials with corresponding notices and extremely burdensome and costly reporting obligations are at odds with the conditions of necessity in a democratic society and proportionality.

The Commission has also found that these initiatives do not comply with the legitimacy condition, since transparency – their stated core objective – is not a legitimate aim in itself, but a means to achieving one or more legitimate aims, such as public order or the prevention of crimes such as money-laundering and terrorism financing. According to the Commission, “for transparency to qualify as a legitimate aim, it would need to be clearly linked to specific public interests and interpreted narrowly.” Moreover, “such a drastic measure, as “public disclosure obligation” (i.e. making public the source of funding and the identity of the donors) may only be justified in cases of political parties and entities formally engaging in remunerated lobbying activities.” In addition, the restrictions on the freedom of association and expression can only be justified if they are necessary to avert a real, and not only hypothetical danger.

The Venice Commission also mentions that the identification of “foreign funding” with “foreign intervention into domestic affairs” is incorrect, since receiving foreign funding does not in itself mean that a person’s independence has been compromised, and should not serve as a basis for discrimination or stigmatization measures.

Some Reflections on the Venice Commission’s Insights

Foreign interference is not merely an illiberal pretext for political repression. Democracies today do face a real threat of covert foreign interference, which requires developing more effective legislation to strengthen the resilience of democratic institutions without fostering illiberal practices. Meanwhile, the pitfalls of legislation on the transparency of foreign influence are by no means limited to illiberal and autocratic models. Even democracies pursuing legitimate objectives may adopt disclosure and registration requirements whose stigmatizing or disproportionate effects threaten freedom of association and expression. It seems, however, that the Venice Commission’s proposals regarding amendments to the “foreign agents” legislation and its analogues are unlikely to be implemented in practice even in democratic jurisdictions.

For example, compliance with the legality condition within the current approach to legislation appears to be quite difficult to achieve, given that many proponents advocate for maintaining government agencies’ discretion and expanding the scope of this legislation, appealing to the hybrid nature of contemporary foreign threats. While the Venice Commission does not deny the hybrid nature of threats, including disinformation campaigns, the aforementioned demands are hardly compatible with the conditions of precision, certainty, and predictability set by the Commission.

The recommendation to replace “foreign agent” and similar stigmatizing labels with more neutral terminology also seems difficult to implement in practice, given current legislative trends, even in democracies. For example, existing anti-foreign interference laws and proposals in the U.S., France, Canada and Australia all depend on identifying persons who act on behalf of foreign principals and making that relationship publicly visible, often through registries. Even the European Commission's proposal, despite expressly distancing itself from “foreign agent” laws, may still carry stigmatizing effects. Eliminating both the special legal status and its public disclosure would therefore require not a mere change in terminology, but a fundamental rethinking of this entire regulatory model.

Perhaps the “foreign agents” legislation and its counterparts should not, indeed, be viewed as a silver bullet for tackling foreign interference. Some experts believe that even democratic versions of this legislation are largely ineffective and pose a threat to human rights. Given the hybrid nature of foreign interference, it would be more effective for democracies to develop legal responses tailored to its specific forms. This approach would seem to be more consistent with the Venice Commission’s central argument linking transparency as a legitimate aim to a specific narrowly interpreted public interest and a concrete danger to public order. It would also respond to public demand in democratic countries.

For example, according to Eurobarometer—the polling instrument used by the EU institutions to monitor regularly the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union—in 2023, covert foreign interference in a country’s politics and economy, including through financing of domestic actors, per se ranked only sixth (21%) among the most serious threats to democracy. The top five threats included, in particular, disinformation in general, spread both online and offline (38%), as well as propaganda and false/misleading information from a non-democratic foreign sources (22%). Another survey of the same year showed that 82% of respondents believed that entities representing foreign governments on EU territory should be registered to prevent covert interference, and over seven in ten (74%) agree that such interference can influence citizens’ voting behavior. A May 2025 Eurobarometer survey indicated that “foreign information manipulation, interference, and disinformation, including in the context of elections” (42%) ranked second among the most serious challenges to democracy in the European Union. Thus, the EU citizens appear more concerned with concrete forms of manipulation, particularly disinformation and electoral interference, than with foreign funding or affiliation as such.

Current lobbying legislation and the corresponding Transparency register could be improved and effectively used to tackle covert foreign interference in elections and other political processes in the EU. This legislation, in particular, may impose public disclosure obligations on interest representatives without conflicting with human rights, following the recommendations of the Venice Commission. Another effective legal tool for achieving these goals could be anti-corruption legislation, such as Directive 2026/1021 on combating corruption, adopted by the European Parliament in April 2026. Meanwhile, both threats—covert political lobbying and corruption in foreign interests—are real, not hypothetical, unlike the all-encompassing “activities on behalf of a foreign principal” provided by the “foreign agents” laws.

Legislation on “foreign agents” also seems ineffective in combating disinformation. Indeed, if actors intentionally misleading citizens of democratic countries in the interests of illiberal forces continue to do so in their official capacity as “foreign agents,” this will not solve the problem of disinformation. The main task in countering this threat is to publicly expose the dissemination of falsehoods and to take legal action against those responsible—such as “troll farms,” cyberattack organizers, and media networks engaged in “information laundering”. Setting up the conditions for independent grassroots investigative journalism and improving media literacy among the general public are also an integral part of democratic mechanisms for countering disinformation. An example of such a comprehensive regulatory framework is the European Democracy Shield, presented by the European Commission in November 2025.

Finally, democratic resilience requires not only restrictions on concrete forms of foreign interference but also means that could foster practices of participatory democracy. It seems that citizens who are directly involved in political decision-making are less susceptible to foreign disinformation, they are able to make a more informed decision while voting and can more effectively ensure that politicians defend their interests than those in a state of civic apathy. Meanwhile, according to Eurobarometer, in 2025, 78% of European respondents said they were not very or not at all familiar with activities that involve people directly in decision-making processes in the European Union. Four out of ten respondents said that these figures could improve with greater transparency and access to information on ways to participate in policymaking. The European Democracy Shield mentioned above partly takes on this task - one of the actions to be rolled out by 2027 is “enhancing societal resilience and citizen engagement.”

Maxim Krupskiy, PhD, is a Human Rights Attorney-at-Law and Research Scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Suggested Citation: Maxim Krupskiy, ‘Regulating Foreign Interference Without Undermining Democracy: Lessons from the Venice Commission’ IACL-AIDC Blog (15 September 2026) Regulating Foreign Interference Without Undermining Democracy: Lessons from the Venice Commission