Metamorphosis of Equality Code: Indian Supreme Court Upholds Caste Sub-Classification
/On August 1, 2024, a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (Davinder), fundamentally altering the legal landscape concerning the reservation policies (a caste-based affirmative action system) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India (see a detailed judgment matrix here). By a 6:1 majority, the Court upheld the constitutionality of sub-classifying castes within the SC/ST categories, thereby overruling the two-decade-old precedent set in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Chinnaiah). In this analysis, I examine the Court’s reasoning on sub-classification, which recognizes the varying degrees of disadvantage within historically marginalized groups, thereby expanding the scope of substantive equality under constitutional law. Furthermore, I argue that this judgment lays the groundwork for a transformative equality approach, though the full realization of this concept would require more explicit engagement with systemic barriers and increased involvement of affected communities in future jurisprudence.
The Origin of the Case
The Davinder case originated from challenges to statutes enacted by different state governments in India regarding reservation policies for Scheduled Castes. The Punjab Scheduled Castes & Backward Classes Act 2006 provided for 25% reservation for Scheduled Castes in government jobs, with 50% of that quota reserved for specific sub-castes (Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs). Similarly, the Tamil Nadu Arunthathiyars Act 2009 reserved 16% of the seats allocated to Scheduled Castes for the Arunthathiyar community. The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes Act 2000 had earlier divided Scheduled Castes into four groups with varying reservation percentages. These state laws were challenged in courts on the grounds that they violated the Constitution and a previous Supreme Court judgment in Chinnaiah, which held that the Scheduled Castes form a homogeneous class that cannot be subdivided/subclassified for reservation purposes.
The High Courts of the different Indian states struck down some of these state laws based on the Chinnaiah precedent. However, when appeals reached the Supreme Court, questions were raised about the correctness of the Chinnaiah judgment itself, particularly in light of the earlier nine-judge bench decision in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Indra Sawhney) which had allowed sub-classification among Other Backward Classes. Given the constitutional importance of the issues involved, including the interplay between Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equal opportunities in public employment), 338 (National Commission for Scheduled Castes), and 341 (Scheduled Castes) of the Constitution, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2020) referred the matter to a larger seven-judge bench. The key question was whether the sub-classification of a reserved class is permissible under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution, or whether the Scheduled Castes constitute a homogeneous or heterogeneous group.
The Constitution Bench & the Equality Code
While tracing the governing principle of reservation in India, CJ Chandrachud, writing for the majority, noted that an ‘Equality Code’ could be extracted from a collective reading of Articles 14-16 of the Constitution, and it embodies equality of status and opportunity and social justice. The Supreme Court examined the evolution of jurisprudence on reservations in India, focusing on two key issues: the model of equality espoused by the Constitution and the interplay between equality and efficiency/merit.
Regarding competing visions of equality, the Court noted that in its formative years, it had interpreted Article 14 through the lens of the classification doctrine, recognizing that formal equality in law does not translate to factual equality. The Court noted that it had historically been reluctant to apply this doctrine to reservations, viewing them as antithetical to equality rather than a restatement. This changed with the judgment in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas which adopted a more expansive reading of the equality code. The Court in that case held that Article 16(4) was not an exception to equality of opportunity, but rather clarified and explained the principle in Article 16(1).
The Court examined the permissibility of sub-classification under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. It began by analyzing the contours of Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The Court noted that these two expressions have different content and sweep, with "equality before the law" meaning the absence of special privileges, and "equal protection of the laws" allowing for reasonable classification of those who are differently placed. The Court emphasized that equality does not entail sameness, and the State can classify in a manner that is not discriminatory. It reiterated that the Constitution permits valid classification if two conditions are fulfilled: first, there must be an intelligible differentia distinguishing the grouped persons from others, and second, the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the law.
Addressing the issue of sub-classification, the Court held that it is not inherently violative of Article 14. The Court referred to State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, to establish that an integrated class could be further classified based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object of the provision. The Court also referred to DS Nakara v. Union of India, which held that the permissibility of sub-classification depends on whether the class is homogeneous for the specific law. The Court emphasized that while sub-classification was permissible, it should not lead to micro-classification, which could undermine the guarantee of equality. Finally, the Court addressed the limits of sub-classification, cautioning against micro-classification that could undermine the guarantee of equality. It referred to the Nakara case to illustrate what could be considered ‘microscopic classification’, such as classifying pensioners based on individual retirement dates. The Court in that case concluded that the permissibility of sub-classification under Article 14 depends on the specific facts of each case, but must adhere to the principles of intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the object of the law. It emphasized that the purpose of classification must be independent of the differentiation itself and that the Court grants the State sufficient latitude in identifying legitimate purposes for classification.
Metamorphosis of Substantive Equality
The Court's reasoning in the Davinder case presents a nuanced approach to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, potentially expanding the principle of substantive equality. By allowing for sub-classification within already classified groups, the Court acknowledges that even within disadvantaged classes, there can be varying degrees of disadvantage. This recognition of heterogeneity aligns with the goals of substantive equality by understanding that equal treatment may not always result in equal outcomes. As CJ Chandrachud noted, the ‘reservation should not be only numerical representation, but qualitative representation’, the Court's emphasis on context-specific analysis and the purpose of the law in question further supports a more flexible application of equality principles. Moreover, the majority’s opinion strengthens and affirms the societal and legal agreement, first established in the Indra Sawhney case, that a thoughtful affirmative action system considering caste is essential. This decision builds upon and further legitimizes the framework set out over 30 years ago for addressing historical inequalities through targeted policies.
Potential for Transformative Equality
The majority's decision in Davinder exhibits elements that resonate with the concept of transformative equality, a paradigm that transcends traditional notions of formal and substantive equality. This perspective is evident in their openness to nuanced classifications and their emphasis on context-specific, data-driven analysis to identify and address the needs of the most marginalized groups. Transformative equality aims to tackle the root causes of inequality and reshape societal institutions and norms. While the majority's reasoning aligns with some aspects of this concept, it falls short of fully embracing it. To truly adopt a transformative equality framework, future jurisprudence would need to more explicitly address systemic barriers to equality, actively involve affected communities in the decision-making processes, and focus on long-term structural changes rather than just immediate remedies. This ruling highlights the potential for the Court to evolve towards a more comprehensive application of transformative equality principles in future cases, potentially reshaping how equality is conceptualized and implemented in legal contexts.
Sarthak Gupta is a Judicial Law Clerk-cum-Research Associate at the Supreme Court of India, currently working under Hon’ble Justice Sandeep Mehta, Judge, Supreme Court. Previously, he clerked for Hon’ble Justice Rajesh Bindal, Judge, Supreme Court. He was not involved in the case in any capacity, and all views expressed are his own, not those of the Court.
Suggested citation: Sarthak Gupta, ‘Metamorphosis of Equality Code: Indian Supreme Court Upholds Caste Sub-Classification’ IACL-AIDC Blog (1 October 2024) Metamorphosis of Equality Code: Indian Supreme Court Upholds Caste Sub-Classification — IACL-IADC Blog (blog-iacl-aidc.org)