Why Translating Forma di Stato Is Almost Impossible — and Why It Matters for Comparative Constitutional Law

Elisa Bertolini & Graziella Romeo

Elisa Bertolini is Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at Bocconi University
Graziella Romeo is Associate Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Bocconi University

Language shapes the way we understand law. This is especially true in comparative constitutional studies, where key concepts must travel across linguistic, conceptual, and cultural borders. One of the clearest examples of this difficulty is the Italian term forma di Stato — a foundational notion in Italian and continental constitutional theory that resists any straightforward translation into English. At first sight, this might seem a difficulty of interest only to Italian scholars concerned with rendering a national concept into globally comprehensible language. Yet the issue is far from being merely Italian. Rather, it exposes a broader challenge for comparative constitutionalism: can we construct a shared conceptual vocabulary that remains intelligible across traditions without flattening theoretical richness? Forma di Stato becomes a case study for the limits (and possibilities) of a genuinely general constitutional law, one that seeks to develop a language intelligible and meaningful across intellectual and cultural contexts.

The challenge of translating this expression reveals how deeply legal ideas are embedded in their historical and cultural settings, and why seemingly simple terms often hold complex meanings.

It is well known that law and language are closely connected. Legal concepts reflect social practices, collective identities, and long-standing intellectual traditions. Translation, therefore, is never a matter of merely replacing one word with another; it is the transfer of meaning from one cultural and legal world into another. Difficulties emerge on several levels. One can name at least three: a) linguistic: differences in vocabulary and grammatical structure; b) pragmatic: differences in audience, context, and communicative purpose; c) cultural: differences in legal traditions, intellectual histories, and constitutional experiences.

The Italian locution ‘forma di Stato’ presents challenges on all three fronts and it is therefore a good test of the difficulties in translating concepts for the purposes of carrying out comparative analysis.  The literal translation of forma di Stato into “form of state” seems straightforward and generally correct. Yet, it fails because the English expression lacks the same conceptual standing of its Italian equivalent. In English-speaking constitutional discourse, the terms “form of state” and “form of government” are not clearly distinguished, and discussions about constitutional design tend to merge them. More importantly, in English-language scholarship, the state is not heavily theorised as an autonomous conceptual object. British and American constitutional law have historically focused on institutions—Parliament, Congress, courts, executives—rather than on the state as a normative, philosophical, or identity-bearing entity. As a result, “form of state” probably reads in English as a loose descriptor rather than an established analytical category with a full explanatory capacity. In other words, the richness of the Italian concept does not carry over.

Understanding why translation is so challenging requires returning to what forma di Stato expresses in Italian constitutional thought. The term describes the evolving relationship between state and citizenry, shaped by values, ideological commitments, and the historical development of political power. It is interdisciplinary, touching not only on law but also on political theory, history, and sociology. It operates in two major dimensions. The first one is historical or diachronic, and it describes different stages of political development that give rise to different forma di Stato (such as the liberal state, the authoritarian or fascist state, the socialist state, the democratic or democratic-pluralistic state). The second one is structural or synchronic, in that it refers, within contemporary democracies, to different territorial arrangements (unitary, regional, federal). These classifications reflect how a state structures itself and the principles through which it distributes authority and liberty. Mortati’s notion of the Stato-ordinamento (state as legal order) —the state understood as a legal order shaped by unitary principles—provides an essential framework for this concept.  This elaboration reveals why the English language lacks a single expression capable of capturing ideological depth, historical evolution, and institutional structure all at once. The challenge of translation becomes clearer when looking at how English-speaking constitutional traditions conceptualise the “state.” In the UK and the US, the state is not typically treated as an identity-bearing or philosophically defined subject. It is generally understood as the territorial and institutional frame within which political authority operates. In the British context, parliamentary sovereignty dominates constitutional thinking. In the American system, emphasis lies on constitutional supremacy and judicial enforcement. Neither tradition has developed a dense theory of the state comparable to continental European thought. This conceptual gap makes forma di Stato appear foreign, overly abstract, or even redundant when translated literally.

Given these differences, a more meaningful translation might be “state identity.” This formulation conveys several core elements of forma di Stato: its reference to foundational values and purposes, the state’s internal and external role, and its constitutional commitments and historical trajectory. “State identity” better captures the idea of the state as a legal and political unity that embodies particular principles guiding the organisation of power and the state’s relationship with citizens. Yet caution is warranted: “identity” can also refer to cultural or national identity. The meaning must therefore be clarified to avoid conflation with non-constitutional concepts. Even so, this translation arguably comes closer than a purely literal rendering.  One might assume that translation difficulties of this kind can now be resolved through AI. After all, these tools can translate words rapidly, with striking accuracy and contextual analysis. However, conceptual translation requires sensitivity to legal culture, familiarity with intellectual traditions, and the ability to navigate historical nuance.

AI can suggest literal or generic equivalents – “form of state,” “state structure,” “state model” – but it cannot, on its own, reconstruct the theoretical and cultural background that gives meaning to concepts such as forma di Stato. To do so, it must be carefully instructed and enriched with human input to the point that human expertise becomes indispensable. In short, accurate conceptual translation requires comparative constitutional awareness and a degree of conceptual creativity that still exceeds purely automated solutions.

The difficulty of translating forma di Stato shows how much legal concepts are shaped by culture, history, and intellectual tradition. Some ideas simply do not travel well, not because translation is impossible, but because they carry layers of meaning that require explanation rather than substitution.

“State identity” may provide a workable approximation, but it must be accompanied by context. The translation challenge itself illustrates the importance of linguistic and conceptual sensitivity in comparative constitutional work.

In this sense, the struggle to translate forma di Stato is not a limitation: it is a valuable reminder that understanding another legal system requires careful attention to its language.

Elisa Bertolini is Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at Bocconi University

Graziella Romeo is Associate Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Bocconi University

Suggested Citation: Elisa Bertolini and Graziella Romeo, ‘Why Translating Forma di Stato Is Almost Impossible — and Why It Matters for Comparative Constitutional Law’ IACL-AIDC Blog (17 March 2026) Why Translating Forma di Stato Is Almost Impossible — and Why It Matters for Comparative Constitutional Law — IACL-IADC Blog