Balancing Democracy and Federalism: Judicial Imposition of Assent Deadlines on State Governors in India
/
Surendra Kumar
Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at Ramaiah College of Law, Bengaluru. He is grateful to Khadija Damana for her research assistance
In a parliamentary democracy, the will of the people, as expressed through their elected legislature, is paramount. But what happens when, in a federal system, a centrally appointed constitutional head of state uses procedural delays to effectively veto that will in respect of the elected legislature of a State? This question drives a recent constitutional battle in India, where the Supreme Court of India (SCI), in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu (the Tamil Nadu judgment), regulated the power of State Governors, sparking debate on the separation of powers. This landmark judgment has profound implications for India’s federal structure. By imposing strict timelines within which Bills must be assented to and rejecting the “pocket veto,” (ie, the withholding of assent to a Bill without expressly rejecting it, effectively killing the bill without formally vetoing it), the Court curbed gubernatorial overreach, reinforcing the principles of federalism and parliamentary democracy. This landmark judgment not only resolves a constitutional crisis in Tamil Nadu but also sets a precedent for Governors’ accountability in India’s multi-party federal democracy. Yet, the Union (Central) government’s Presidential reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India on 13 May 2025 signals a push to reexamine this judicial imprimatur.
This post argues that while the Indian Constitution had a textual centralizing drift, this judgment seeks to rebalance the relationship between the Union and the States by adopting an originalist understanding to fill constitutional silence. The post will briefly discuss the position of the Governor in the Indian constitutional system and the implications of the judgment for India’s strained dysfunctional democracy. Ultimately, the Tamil Nadu judgment grounds its reasoning in extensive comparative law to assert that nominal executive heads cannot stymie democratic functioning and paralyze governance in India’s States by withholding assent to Bills.
The State Governor in the Indian Constitutional System
In India, State Governors are appointed by the President and serve as constitutional heads of states, linking the Union and State governments. Their key duties encompass assenting to Bills passed by State legislatures, summoning or dissolving State legislatures, and appointing Chief Ministers. Typically, all these functions are exercised in accordance with the aid and advice of the State’s Council of Ministers (Constitution of India, Article 163).
The Tamil Nadu Scenario and the SCI’s Judgment
The recent scenario in Tamil Nadu, leading to the SCI’s judgment that is the focus of this blog post, revealed a breakdown of the constitutional morality and statesmanship expected of constitutional functionaries. The Governor of Tamil Nadu delayed action on numerous Bills, including university amendments for Vice-Chancellor appointments, some pending since January 2020. This delay acted as a “pocket veto”, a concept the Supreme Court deemed alien to India’s Constitution. Aggrieved by the inaction of the Governor, Tamil Nadu filed a case in 2023. After the Supreme Court took cognizance, the Governor of Tamil Nadu abruptly withheld assent from 10 Bills on 13 November 2023. The Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly responded with a special session on 18 November 2023, repassing the Bills unchanged and resubmitting them for assent. Yet, on 28 November 2023, the Governor reserved these for the President.
These actions of the Governor of Tamil Nadu defied the SCI’s ruling in State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023) (the Punjab judgment), in which the Court expressed disapproval about indefinite delays and accused Governors of ‘thwart[ing] the normal course of lawmaking’. In the Tamil Nadu judgment, the SCI rejected the concept of a veto under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, which requires Governors either to assent to Bills, to withhold assent with a reconsideration message, or reserve them for the President. The phrase “shall declare” in Article 200 mandates action, not inaction. Withholding assent is tied to the first proviso, requiring a return “as soon as possible” with a reconsideration message. The Punjab judgment clarified that this conveys utmost urgency. The Court, in the Tamil Nadu judgment, dismissed the Governor’s reliance on the judgment in Union of India v Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979) (in which the SCI said a Bill will fall through or lapse if not assented to or returned), clarifying that a Bill lapses only if the legislature chooses not to repass it, not due to the Governor’s withholding of asset. Withholding assent without a message was deemed unconstitutional, and reserving repassed Bills was “illegal and erroneous” since, after the Assembly complies with the reconsideration process, assent becomes the only option unless significant amendments reintroduce discretion.
To address Article 200’s silence and prevent legislative paralysis, the Tamil Nadu judgment sets timelines for a State Governor to act on a bill—one month for decisions taken on the advice of the Council of Ministers, three months taken against that advice, and one month for repassed Bills. In setting these timelines, the SCI invoked ‘reasonableness’ from cases like Durga Pada Ghosh v State of West Bengal (1972), Keisham Meghachandra Singh v The Hon’ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), and A.G. Perarivalan v State of Tamil Nadu (2022), which addressed executive inaction.
Under Article 163(1) of the Constitution of India the SCI said—referencing Constituent Assembly Debates and Dr. Ambedkar’s stance that “in a responsible government, there can be no room for the Governor acting on discretion” in assent matters—the exercise of gubernatorial discretion is limited to specific exceptions: explicit constitutional provisions (eg, the second proviso to Article 200), necessary implications (eg, appointing a Chief Minister post-election), or grave perils to democracy (M.P. Special Police Establishment v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004).
The Supreme Court’s use of Article 142 (ie, the SCI’s plenary power to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice) to deem assent for the 10 Tamil Nadu Bills sparked debate over judicial overreach. The Court defended this extraordinary step as a necessary response to the Governor’s unconstitutional actions, prolonged delays, and lack of good faith, citing A.G. Perarivalan (2022) where the Article 142 power was used to address executive inaction. Far from routine, this was framed as an extraordinary remedy to prevent constitutional paralysis, not a power grab.
Only Opposition-Ruled States have Governor’s Exceptionalism
The Governor’s office has become politicized in India, particularly in opposition-led States (ie, States governed by parties opposed to the Bhartiya Jana Party (BJP), which leads the Union government). Similar challenges concerning gubernatorial powers, particularly regarding assent to Bills, have been observed in Punjab (Aam Aadmi Party-ruled), Telangana, and Kerala (Left Democratic Front-ruled), all of which have sought judicial intervention from the SCI. The Governor’s office in India has faced devaluation from political misuse, mitigated by judicial correction. Pre-S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994), en masse dismissals of State governments occurred with central government changes, and these dismissals were upheld by the SCI. The Tamil Nadu Governor’s conduct exemplifies a gross erosion of constitutional values. His delays and improper actions suggest an abuse of power, defeating the will of the people through deliberate inaction.
On 13 May 2025, President Droupadi Murmu invoked Article 143(1) of the Constitution, seeking the SCI’s opinion on 14 questions. These questions directly challenge the 8 April judgment in the Tamil Nadu case that imposed strict timelines on Governors under Article 200 and, by extension, on the President under Article 201 (where a Governor reserves a Bill for the consideration of the President). The reference highlights perceived “conflicting judgments” regarding the reviewability of the President's actions under Article 201 and raises significant concerns over the SCI's use of Article 142 to grant assent to the Tamil Nadu Bills, a truly historic first accomplished without assent by either the State Governor or President. One could interpret this presidential reference as a calculated effort to gain further legal clarity, potentially with the aim of re-evaluating the degree to which the executive's hands are tied by the Tamil Nadu judgment. It seeks to redefine judicial intervention’s limits in executive functions.
Conclusion
The Tamil Nadu judgment reinforces federalism and democracy, part of the Constitution of India’s Basic Structure. Federalism and democracy, entrenched constitutionally across post-colonial Westminster style Parliamentary democracies, are non-derogable in India. The ruling curbs gubernatorial overreach, reinforcing the Governor’s role as a constitutional head bound to facilitate elected governments’ functioning. Quoting Dr. Ambedkar, the Court urges statesmanship. Carl Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, “he who decides on the exception” raises questions about the judiciary’s role against majoritarian governments. While the office of Governor, serving as a vital link between the Union and the States, cannot be abolished, this landmark judgment sends a clear and unequivocal message against weaponizing procedural silence for political ends.
Surendra Kumar is Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at Ramaiah College of Law, Bengaluru. He is grateful to Khadija Damana for her research assistance.
Suggested citation: Surendra Kumar, ‘Balancing Democracy and Federalism: Judicial Imposition of Assent Deadlines on State Governors in India’, IACL-AIDC Blog (26 June 2025) Balancing Democracy and Federalism: Judicial Imposition of Assent Deadlines on State Governors in India — IACL-IADC Blog
![Xx1088_-_Seoul_city_nightscape_during_1988_Paralympics_-_3b_-_Scan [test].jpg](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5af3f84a4eddec846552ea29/1527486925632-3VZP3ASLAHP1LJI0D9NJ/Xx1088_-_Seoul_city_nightscape_during_1988_Paralympics_-_3b_-_Scan+%5Btest%5D.jpg)
