Constitutional Courts: Constraint or Legitimation? Lessons from the Arab Spring

Constitutional Courts: Constraint or Legitimation? Lessons from the Arab Spring

Tamara El KHOURY

Tamara El Khoury continues our symposium on Francesco Biagi’s recent book ‘Constitution-Building After the Arab Spring: A Comparative Perspective’ by asking when constitutional courts constrain political power, and when their creation instead legitimates the settlement they operate within.

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Constitution-Building After the Arab Spring: Global Comparative Perspectives

Constitution-Building After the Arab Spring: Global Comparative Perspectives

Alemayehu Fentaw WELDEMARIAM

Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam opens our symposium on Francesco Biagi’s recent book ‘Constitution-Building After the Arab Spring: A Comparative Perspective’ by reflecting on its central arguments and the questions left open in the decades since the revolution altered the constitutional structures of several Arab countries.

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“Militant” Democracy under the ECHR: Between Pluralism and Democratic Self-Defence

“Militant” Democracy under the ECHR: Between Pluralism and Democratic Self-Defence

Kriszta KOVÁCS

Kriszta Kovács examines the “paradox of militant democracy” under the European Convention on Human Rights. Relying on Bradshaw v. the UK (2025), the author finds that the ECtHR’s insufficient reliance on protective duties (positive obligations) risks undermining the effectiveness of the protection of liberal democracy.

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Constitutionalizing Public Security in Chile

Constitutionalizing Public Security in Chile

Benjamín ALEMPARTE

A proposed constitutional reform on public security in Chile would give security claims greater constitutional weight while expanding exceptional executive powers. Benjamín Alemparte (Universidad de Chile) examines how constitutionalizing security may reshape the balance between state authority, individual rights and judicial review.

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Is There a Constitutional Duty of Disloyalty? – Constitutional Fidelity of Civil Servants in the Age of Political Extremism

Is There a Constitutional Duty of Disloyalty? – Constitutional Fidelity of Civil Servants in the Age of Political Extremism

Cheng-Yi HUANG

Professor Cheng-Yi Huang discusses the concept of constitutional fidelity and asks if there is a duty of disloyalty on the part of public officials when faced with potentially unconstitutional policies from the executive. He looks specifically at the legal conditions and restrictions placed on dual citizens of Taiwan and China who seek to hold public positions in Taiwan. He concludes that constitutional fidelity and the duty of disloyalty are two sides of the same coin since public officials are ultimately charged to uphold the constitutional order itself, not the interests of a political party.

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Constitutional Reconstruction and Removal of Veto Players

Constitutional Reconstruction and Removal of Veto Players

Tímea DRINÓCZI

Tímea Drinóczi develops a framework based on EU case law and Venice Commission standards for justifying the removal of powerful institutional actors who could block constitutional reconstruction after democratic backsliding. This framework is applied to Hungary to assess whether removing the President or Constitutional Court judges could be constitutionally justified.

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