Sounding the Alarm, and the Italian Regions’ Limited Ability to Counter Democratic Regression

Petra Malfertheiner & Elisabeth Alber

Eurac Research Institute for Comparative Federalism

Cultural hegemony lies at the heart of Meloni’s coalition government and its policymaking that continues to reshape the public space vis-à-vis immigration, sexual minorities, cultural institutions, and the freedom in academia and the media. Reminding us of the work of the Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci, cultural hegemony refers to the forces of persuasion that enable a society to consent to political change. Its construction is typically accomplished through social institutions, which enable those in positions of power to significantly shape the values, expectations, worldviews, and behaviors of the broader society. This process takes place through the influence and control of institutions, and it has been inherent to the many and mostly populist constitutional politics debates Italy experienced since the 1990s. 

In this blog, we critically analyze the attempts to centralize power and discuss how fundamental rights have been restricted in Italy since 22 October 2022, the day in which the far right-leaning coalition government of Giorgia Meloni was sworn in. We discuss the (potential) transformative impact of reform attempts on the forms of government (the state apparatus) and of policymaking on the forms of state (state-community-order). We argue that the signs of more illiberal aspirations in the Italian democratic order should not be ignored and instead be discussed more systematically through the lens of subnational constitutional politics.

Meloni’s coalition government

Since the parliamentary elections in September 2022, which resulted in a solid parliamentary majority for the governing alliance, the first female Prime Minister of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, and her far right-leaning  coalition comprising Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia, and Lega have come under intense international scrutiny, with their actions and policies closely examined for signs of democratic erosion. Just over two years in, Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia party, long part of the political minority, is comfortably installed in power, establishing themselves as constructive partners in Brussels: they have continuously committed steadfast support to Ukraine, and their candidate, Raffaele Fitto, is one of the Vice Presidents of the European Commission. This stance sets them apart from leaders like the Hungarian strongman Viktor Orbán. Yet, beneath the surface, traces of authoritarian legacies remain.

Democracy by acclamation

A key component of the government’s agenda is the proposed Premierato reform, the ‘Mother of all reforms’ as Meloni coined it, which signals a fundamental shift in Italy’s political system and an alteration of the balance of power. This proposed constitutional change seeks to introduce the direct election of the Prime Minister, effectively transforming Italy from a parliamentary republic into a semi-presidential system. By proposing the direct election of the Prime Minister, the Premierato reform aligns with the existing practice for regional presidents, prescribed by the Constitutional Law no 1/1999 and applied unless the regional constitution provides otherwise. The move towards empowering the Prime Minister reflects a broader push to consolidate power, with proponents arguing that such a change is a means of ensuring greater stability in Italy’s notoriously unstable government system (from the founding of the Italian Republic in 1946 to the present day, there has been 31 Prime Ministers who have led a total of 68 governments). However, this reform risks undermining the checks and balances that have defined Italy’s democratic structure, with the direct election model and the proposed ‘majority bonus’ potentially distorting representativity. By granting the Prime Minister’s party or their coalition a majority of seats in both parliamentary chambers (the draft bill remains unclear on this point), the reform could allow the executive to dominate the legislature, weakening the parliamentary system and the role of the President of the Republic. In fact, the reform foresees that in the event of the Prime Minister’s dismissal through a vote of no confidence by Parliament, the chambers will be automatically dissolved, with the President of the Republic, widely regarded as an impartial guardian of the political process, having no discretion to find alternative solutions.

Critics argue that this concentration of power may lead to a weakening of democratic accountability. Moreover, the reform’s focus on simplifying decision-making and strengthening the role of the Prime Minister comes at the expense of traditional safeguards, trading political legitimacy for stability instead of yielding more governmental stability by reforming the electoral law. With the majority bonus, the ruling party or coalition could seize control of the state apparatus. In fact, in Italy, positions in key institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, the High Council of the Judiciary, and independent agencies are appointed with a threshold of a maximum of three-fifths of the votes in Parliament. An absolute majority is sufficient for the election of the President of the Republic, from the fourth ballot onwards, and for amending the Constitution, although a referendum would be required in the latter case. Approved by the Senate in June 2024 during its first reading, the reform is currently under review by the Chamber of Deputies (constitutional laws must be approved twice by each chamber of Parliament). It is expected to face a referendum by 2025 or 2026, a process that, while strategically planned, carries limited political risks for Meloni. Unlike past reforms, which were unpopular and avoided referendums, Meloni’s proposal taps into the desire for strong leadership and stability, making it a potentially powerful tool for consolidating her (in) power.

The controversial reform of the judiciary

In parallel with the Premierato reform, the government has put forth a reform aimed at restructuring the judiciary. It intends to dismantle the traditional unity within the judiciary by separating the career paths of judges and prosecutors. Much like the proposed direct election of the Prime Minister, the reform of the judiciary can be seen as a symbolic and populist move to address public dissatisfaction with the status quo. Perceived judicial independence in Italy continues to be low, with only 36% of the public rating the independence of courts and judges as “fairly or very good” in 2024—a decline compared to the previous year.

Critics of the reform, including the National Association of the Judiciary, have vehemently opposed the proposal, arguing that it would be a move to undermine judicial independence, increase political control, and diminish its function, posing potential risks to Italy’s foundational democratic safeguards. The low level of independence of Italy’s judiciary system is a feature that has been highlighted by the European Commission’s Rule of Law Reports and expert bodies. Notably, reforming the judiciary has been a core aim of Italy’s right-wing parties ever since Berlusconi was relentlessly pursued by a succession of public attorneys.

Regression in rights

Beyond the more evident constitutional reforms, the Meloni government has overseen more subtle regressions in rights that signal a gradual regression of democracy. One such example is the controversial law granting anti-abortion activists access to counseling centers, which intrudes upon the private lives of individuals. This amendment is part of a broader trend in Italy, where accessing abortion services have become increasingly complex and obstructed. The government has consistently opposed progressive social reforms, such as those advocating for marriage equality and gender recognition for LGBTQIA+ individuals, contributing to Italy ranking 35th out of 49 European countries in 2024 regarding laws and policies that impact LGBTQIA+ rights. In October 2024, the Italian parliament passed a law criminalizing surrogate motherhood, further restricting the rights of LGBTQIA+ families and deepening the challenges they face in securing legal recognition for their children. Notably, the government has adopted a hardline stance on immigration. A litany of legal evidence provided by multiple international organizations indicate that the Italian government is committing human rights abuses against immigrants attempting to enter the EU. Recent high-profile cases, such as the judicial opposition to Italy’s controversial migration deal with Albania, which has now resulted in a political disaster, highlight ongoing tensions between political authority and the judiciary with the latter continuing to be a target of attacks by public officers. These tensions are not isolated but extend to other areas of democratic freedoms, including freedom of expression. Despite existing regulations designed to protect journalists from threats, they still encounter several obstacles in the exercise of their profession. Instances of physical assaults, death threats and other forms of intimidations have been reported, which continue to raise concerns about the safety of journalists in Italy. While some regions have attempted to voice opposition to certain policies of the Meloni government such as the relocation and expulsion of migrants, and restrictions on abortion or LGBTQIA+ rights, their influence has been largely limited.

Partisan control of regional institutions

In essence, Italy’s institutional framework excludes regions from the national legislative process, and the multi-party centralized political system, dominated by coalitions, has led to partisan control of regional institutions. Out of 20 regions, 14 are governed by the parties governing in coalition at national level. The absence of a federal culture, or the enormous gap between constitutional theory and reality, means that, aside from symbolic criticism, regions lack the institutional mechanisms to counteract regressive political trends. They are also torn apart regarding the law on differentiated autonomy that prescribes laborious and time-consuming procedures for implementing differentiated regional policymaking in the country’s fifteen ordinary regions. This law intends to transfer up to 23 shared or central government’s exclusive competences in areas such as health, education, environment, transport, and energy to those requesting it.  For now, the law cannot be applied. The Constitutional Court did not find the entire law unconstitutional but pointed out that specific aspects of the law were unconstitutional. It ruled that Parliament needs to fill the gaps to ensure the full functionality of the law. This includes the issue of possible imbalances in the State budget that derive from an inappropriate implementation of the law.

Sounding the alarm for constitutional and societal resilience

While fears of a neofascist shift under the Meloni government may be exaggerated, what is evident is the emergence of measures aiming at centralizing power, which would gradually erode Italy’s democratic foundations. The increasing centralization of power, alongside the lack of influence by the regions and the reduction of pluralism in both political and social spheres, signals a concerning trend. Fundamental rights, rather than being expanded or further developed, are quietly being curtailed, with measures that undermine judicial independence, restrict media freedom, and roll back protections for marginalized groups. These subtle yet significant shifts point to a broader process of democratic backsliding backed up by a profound system transformation that warrants ongoing scrutiny and resistance. In the end, constitutional and societal resilience to any kinds of populisms and extremisms are common goods that are not a matter of course and should therefore not be jeopardized lightly. Or, put differently, the reform attempts and policies raise genuine constitutional politics issues.

Elisabeth Alber is senior researcher and leads the research group ‘Participation and Innovations’ at the Eurac Research Institute for Comparative Federalism (Italy). She also heads the Eurac Research Federal Scholar in Residence Program.

Petra Malfertheiner is researcher, outreach and dissemination officer at the Eurac Research Institute for Comparative Federalism (Italy). Her expertise includes the Italian political system and territorial autonomies. She is editor-in-chief of the DiGoP Diversity Governance Paper series and the EUreka! blog

This blog is part of the blog symposium Federal Coalitions and Subnational Democracy hosted by the IACL Research Group on Constitutionalism and Societal Pluralism: Diversity Governance Compared.

Suggested Citation: Petra Malfertheiner and Elisabeth Alber, ‘Sounding the alarm, and the Italian regions’ limited ability to counter democratic regression’ IACL-AIDC Blog (28 November 2024) Sounding the Alarm, and the Italian Regions’ Limited Ability to Counter Democratic Regression — IACL-IADC Blog