Democracy in Paradise: Seychelles’ Struggle Against Executive Dominance

Joelle Barnes

Dr Joelle Barnes is a lecturer with the Judicial Institute for Africa at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. A large part of her work over the past decade has focused on the development of Seychellois law.

When Seychelles adopted its new Constitution in 1993, the small island nation made a bold commitment to liberal democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. Thirty years later, the question remains: can a tiny state truly separate powers when everyone knows everyone?

From Autocracy to Democracy—On Paper

Seychelles’ history before 1993 was marked by domination. Two centuries of colonial rule gave way to President Albert René’s brutal autocratic regime following his 1977 coup d’état. René transformed Seychelles into a one-party “Sovereign Socialist Republic,” consolidating all executive power in his hands, backed by the military and a compliant People’s Assembly. His rule was characterized by state oppression, disappearances, arbitrary detention, and systematic political persecution—abuses only recently documented by the Truth, Reconciliation and National Unity Commission.

The 1993 Constitution was designed to prevent such excesses from recurring. It introduced a separation of powers, enforceable human rights, judicial review, and crucially, a suite of “fourth branch” institutions—independent bodies tasked with checking executive power. These include the Constitutional Appointments Authority, the Ombudsman, the Electoral Commission, and the Auditor-General, among others.

Yet three decades on, executive dominance persists. The story of Seychelles’ constitutional journey reveals both the challenges of building democracy in small states and surprising signs of hope in unexpected places.

Presidential Exceptionalism: Power by Design

Part of the problem lies in the 1993 Constitution itself. The President remains extraordinarily powerful. Unlike the legislature and judiciary, executive authority vests in the President personally, not institutionally (art 66(1); cf art 85 and art 119). Additionally, the President historically holds three major ministerial portfolios on top of his presidential duties.

Moreover, the members of the National Assembly can question ministers under article 93(1) but not the President directly and many laws vest unfettered discretionary powers in the President, even over portfolios he does not personally manage. The result is a presidency that can influence virtually every aspect of governance in ways not feasible in larger countries. In Seychelles’ tiny bureaucracy, citizens regularly bring complaints directly to the President’s office, and these are sometimes resolved by the President personally.

The Lost Opportunity: 43 Years of One-Party Rule

Constitutional reform alone could not overcome Seychelles’ authoritarian legacy. René won the first two multiparty elections, and his political party remained in power until 2020—43 years of executive continuity stretching back to the illegal coup. The chilling effect of the old regime’s intimidation and oppression lingered long after democratic institutions were established.

The Usual Suspects: Assembly and Courts

The National Assembly’s effectiveness as a check on executive power depends entirely on whether the President’s party controls it. When the ruling party holds a majority in the National Assembly, meaningful oversight evaporates. And yet, after 23 years of acquiescence, opposition control of the Assembly from 2016-2020 produced not constructive oversight but political theatre—blocking ministerial appointments to demand fresh elections, establishing extra-judicial committees without fair procedures, and playing to live broadcasts on radio and YouTube.

The judiciary presents a more complex picture. Around 2007, judges began applying robust common law standards of judicial review to ministerial decisions. This represented genuine progress in holding the executive accountable. However, the past decade has seen backsliding. Courts increasingly defer to the President or find technical reasons to avoid politically sensitive cases.

Judges face real constraints. The judiciary lacks financial autonomy, relying on the executive for its budget, which is subject to spontaneous cuts. The judiciary must appeal to the President himself, as Minister of Legal Affairs, for resources. Additionally, most judges and lawyers received their foundational training in foreign law, not Seychellois constitutional law, and there are no textbooks on local public law. Perhaps most significantly, there is a cultural reluctance to challenge executive actions, particularly presidential ones—whether due to historical conditioning, fear of reprisal, or simply the social proximity inherent in a small state.

The Surprising Hope: Fourth Branch Institutions

The most encouraging developments in Seychelles’ separation of powers emerge not from the Assembly or courts, but from the supposedly weak fourth branch institutions. After decades of under-resourcing and political interference, these bodies are slowly finding their voice.

The Constitutional Appointments Authority, responsible for appointing judges and other key officials, has been plagued by political capture through its inherently political appointment process. Members often lack judicial experience or independence, with active politicians and party cronies regularly appointed despite constitutional requirements for “proven integrity and impartiality” (article 141(a)). Yet even this body has recently adopted transparent procedures aligned with international principles, though implementation remains inconsistent.

The Ombudsman has become increasingly assertive. The number of complaints received has risen consistently (suggesting greater public trust), reports have been produced in court cases, and the office has even joined constitutional challenges.

Despite facing budget cuts “at the whim of the executive,” having recommendations ignored by government departments, and being excluded from budget deliberations, the Ombudsman continues developing its mandate. The study reveals similar stories across other fourth branch institutions: the Public Service Appeal Board finally secured proper offices and staff in 2022 after “many years of struggle”; the Electoral Commission has successfully introduced reforms addressing procedural gaps; the Auditor-General enjoys relative autonomy and productive relationships with government entities.

The establishment of independent media has also been transformative. After decades of state control and censorship, reforms in 2010-2017 granted greater autonomy to state broadcasters, reduced license costs for new entrants, and expanded the media landscape to ten outlets. While challenges remain, journalists now enjoy significantly wider space for critical reporting.

Too Small to Separate or Too Soon to Tell?

Seychelles’ experience reveals the peculiar challenges small states face in building democratic governance. The smallness that enables the President to be everywhere, that makes anonymous political activity impossible, and that creates social proximity between all political actors—these factors work against formal institutional separation.

Yet that same smallness offers advantages. Small changes can take effect quickly. Direct relationships between citizens and representatives create opportunities for accountability through political pressure. The reduced distance between elected officials and voters means an informed citizenry could demand their Assembly representatives exercise proper oversight.

The path forward requires several reforms: unbundling the President’s symbolic and political roles to reduce excessive deference; ensuring Constitutional Appointments Authority members meet constitutional standards; strengthening judicial independence through financial autonomy and better insulation from executive interference; establishing stable funding mechanisms for fourth branch institutions; and building public awareness about these institutions’ accountability roles.

Thirty years after its democratic transition, Seychelles hasn’t achieved the separation of powers its Constitution envisions. Executive dominance remains the defining feature of governance. Yet the slow strengthening of fourth branch institutions suggests it may be premature to declare the experiment a failure. In the incremental progress of the Ombudsman, the transparency initiatives of previously captured bodies, and the emergence of independent media, we see the gradual taking root of constitutional culture.

For other small states grappling with similar challenges, Seychelles offers both cautionary tales and reasons for hope. Democracy’s development is often gradual, requiring sustained commitment and patience. Sometimes the most important progress happens not in the institutions we expect, but in the ones we have overlooked—the not-so-usual suspects that, given time and support, might yet deliver on democracy’s promise.

This blog post is part of the IACL Blog symposium Small State Constitutionalism, which presents some of the key arguments made in chapters of the newly-published edited collection: Elisabeth Perham, Maartje De Visser and Rosalind Dixon (eds) Small State Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2026).

Dr Joelle Barnes is a lecturer with the Judicial Institute for Africa at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. A large part of her work over the past decade has focused on the development of Seychellois law.

Suggested Citation: Joelle Barnes, ‘Democracy in Paradise: Seychelles’ Struggle Against Executive Dominances’ IACL-AIDC Blog (26 March 2026) Democracy in Paradise: Seychelles’ Struggle Against Executive Dominance — IACL-IADC Blog