Unpacking the Ethno-Federalist Narrative in Lebanon: A Socio-Historic Analysis

André Sleiman

In Lebanon, federalism is a controversial and deeply polarising topic that keeps triggering extreme reactions – fervent support on the one hand, utter rejection and criticism on the other. Its proponents argue that only a federal political system can neutralise the recurring inter-sectarian clashes and frictions by granting each of the largest sectarian groups enough political autonomy and territorial sovereignty to freely pursue their own political projects, and therefore by eliminating the dependency relationships that bind the Lebanese sectarian groups together.

Lebanon is governed by a sectarian power-sharing system that crucially hinges on the consensus between sectarian élites. After the ratification of the Taef Agreement in 1990, this consensus was dependent upon the arbitration of the Syro-Lebanese regime. Since the weakening of the Syrian influence on Lebanon in 2005, the political system muddled through protracted periods of constitutional void: presidential vacuums in 2007–2008 and 2014–2016 (and now in 2022), and political gridlocks resulting from an agonising government formation process, all of which left lead-footed caretaker governments in charge of the country for several months, without constitutional leverage to adopt, implement, or monitor any meaningful policy, let alone reforms.

The pitfalls of this system are many, and almost all observers of Lebanon agree on the diagnosis: the post-war understanding (and practice) of power-sharing has degenerated into a system of élite bargains, deal-making, and state capture – something closer to “pie-sharing” politics. 

Federalism promises to break these dependency dynamics through an institutional architecture that would absorb the perceived antagonistic interests of the sectarian groups vying for influence and resources. At the central level, there would be a shared federal entity consisting of a bare minimum (monetary policy, foreign affairs, and national defence), while federated or regional governments, each with its own constitutional and institutional apparatus, would provide public services, offer protection, and enable political participation.

The federalist narrative seems almost in line with the tenets of liberal democracy and the early 20th century longings for self-determination. But can it end Lebanon’s recurring woes? Its opponents are quick to associate it with Zionist and “imperialist” conspiracy theories, or, to a more moderate extent, with the threat of partition.

When studying federalism in Lebanon, one finds almost no middle stance that puts the emergence of federalism into a socio-historic perspective, nor is there a sober reflection on why it triggers such vehement reactions (for a deeper discussion see my dissertation “Vivre ensemble mais séparés ? L’émergence et l’évolution des projets de fédération au Liban de 1975 à nos jours”). This bird’s eye examination dives deeper into this political project and unpacks its hidden meanings: what does federalism designate, and what does it mean when we talk about federalism in Lebanon? 

From a semantic point of view, the designation matches more the concept of “ethno-federalism”. Federalism is a political system defined by a constitutional setup that organises relations between states within a union. In Lebanon the particularism of the federalist narrative is its entrenchment in ethnic identities. It is not defined by “racial” or “biological” kinship, but by a perceived belonging or affiliation to a cultural, linguistic, or religious identity, one that acquires a de facto ethnic character. Specifically, the ethno-federalist narrative rests on three pillars: the obsession with equality, the fixation on self-identity, and the conundrum of managing “pluralism”.

The first pillar – equality – emphasises the principle of safeguarding equal status for all citizens. Ethno-federalism is a minority-driven narrative that emerged from leading Christian intellectuals shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War in 1975. The majority-Christian “Lebanese Front” defended the Lebanese model that had granted, since 1943 and until 1990, the Maronite President considerable constitutional powers. Although these powers were rarely used, the mere constitutional leverage left to the discretion of the President was enough to become the subject of contestation by the opposing majority-Muslim “Lebanese National Movement”. The federalists realised that Lebanon’s shifting demographics could no longer sustain the legitimacy of the “ancient régime”. Fearing a shift in the institutional power balance, ethno-federalism drew much of its substance from the rejection of the dhimma – a “second-level citizenship” status of sorts reserved for Christians and Jews who would be destined to live under the protection, but also at the mercy of the majority-Muslim mainstream culture. The case for ethno-federalism is not only concerned with the issue of equality between individuals, but also with the issue of equality between sectarian groups. This equality is not limited to political representation but stretches to the realms of the state administration (public resources) and even the market (private resources).

As a minority-centred narrative, the rejection of the dhimma ties in naturally with ethno-federalism’s second pillar: the fixation on self-identity. The ethno-federalist premise is that mainstream Arab-Muslim culture “minoritises”, suppresses, downplays, or persecutes alternative identities. From this perspective, ethno-federalism emerges as a “noble” quest for preserving the cultural pluralism afforded by Lebanon’s variegated identity groups. However, the federalists’ depiction of identity politics emphasises inter-ethnic frictions while overlooking intra-ethnic competition and antagonisms. Drawing the fault lines between sectarian groups does not account enough for the diversity within these groups and the conflicts among them. Similarly, inter-ethnic convergences are either downplayed or represented as “ephemeral”, “tactical”, or “pragmatic”, whereas intra-ethnic alliances are also often motivated by the same factors. In sum, ethno-federalism posits that politics and identity are the expression of one another, but it overlooks the fact that the same dynamics that drive ethnic groups together, or apart, are also at play within these groups.

There emerges the thorny issue of “pluralism”. Lebanon is a house of many mansions where several groups dwell that cherish their linguistic idiosyncrasies, harbour different cultural sensitivities, and seem to actualise different values – perhaps even worldviews. But the many commonalities that define the Lebanese culture are silenced in the ethno-federalist narrative. All these considered, then, what makes Lebanon’s diversity different from that of any other country – like France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and many others – that boasts of its local and regional identities? Identity is a conceptual trap that politics handily reduces to a single, all-encompassing facet.

The third pillar of the ethno-federalist proposition is the promise of a peaceful management of pluralism. By maximising the political autonomy, legitimacy, and sovereignty of Lebanon’s religious sects, ethno-federalism effectively grants these sects the right to “live apart in a shared system”, or, put differently, the right to “live together, each in its own space”. The proposition almost seems to carry liberal democratic values, embodied in the freedom of each group to exercise not only its own religious customs but also to give free rein to its own understanding of history and culture. However, the federal pacts that bind together countries like the US or Germany, to name a few, are premised on a sense of unity (hence the etymology of the word foedus, a treaty of friendship, peace, and alliance), rather than an arrangement to prevent secession – a politically less palatable proposition. Even California’s or Bavaria’s self-proclaimed “exceptionalism” is not grounds for divorce, nor does it threaten their strong sense of belonging to one federal nation.

Therefore, an ethno-federal system in Lebanon might not be sustainable if it is serving as an institutional bulwark against disunion. Sooner or later, the federal edifice, as tempting as it might appear, might crack and fall prey to these intrinsic tensions.

In addition, federal systems are legally complex. They are built on meticulously codified institutional arrangements between the federal government and the federated states. This institutional engineering is difficult to realise in a country like Lebanon where the constitutional, legal, and administrative cultures are not conducive to federalism. Lebanon has not yet broken away from the French administration model and is still highly centralised. Its municipal system is weighed down by many centralistic elements, and the adoption of the Expanded Administrative Decentralisation reform that is stipulated in the Taef Agreement, is far from sight.

It will require an overriding political consensus for Lebanon to press forward towards a federal system. During the Civil War, most critiques of ethno-federalism came from the very breeding ground on which it flourished. A flurry of research articles, studies, essays, and opinion pieces marshalled considerable evidence against it. On the other side of the spectrum, the Muslim rejection of ethno-federalism was reduced to a mere prêt-à-penser: pre-packaged ideological dogmas fixated on abstract nationalist ideals and conspiratorial rhetoric.

In recent years, there have been some rare Sunni figures calling for federalism. Like their Christian fellow citizens, these were haunted by the fear of witnessing political power slipping away from the hands of one group to another – from the Sunnis to the Shia. The Sunni-Shia antagonism and the rising supremacy of Hezbollah in Lebanon might, therefore, trigger a new momentum for the ethno-federalist proposition.

Ethno-federalism will remain at the centre of controversies for years to come. The prospects of its realisation will not only depend on its political desirability, but also on the technical accuracy and the administrative feasibility of its institutional design. Ethno-federalism reveals much of the assumptions underlying the seemingly irreconcilable differences among the Lebanese. If anything, its main function would be to shed light on the lingering demons of the past.

André Sleiman is a Governance & Public Policy Consultant.

Suggested Citation: André Sleiman, ‘Unpacking the ethno-federalist narrative in Lebanon: A socio-historic analysis’ IACL-AIDC Blog (1 November 2022) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/lebanon/2022/11/1/unpacking-the-ethno-federalist-narrative-in-lebanon-a-socio-historic-analysis.