A Constitutionally Preferable Approach to Conducting Simultaneous Elections

Eesha Shrotriya & Shantanu Pachauri

School of Law, RV University

Introduction

In 2014, the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”), with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the helm, came to power in India. Since then, the democratic system in the country has witnessed an incremental and systemic decline. The 2024 V-Dem Institute Democracy Report, while terming India as an “electoral autocracy”, ranked the country at fourth place in the list of countries exhibiting the maximum decline in the Liberal Democracy Index. The government, in its ten-year tenure, has used varied tools to undermine electoral and institutional accountability through legislative and constitutional changes, compromised the independence of the media, attacked civil society, intimidated the opposition, introduced draconian criminal laws, and silenced dissent in academia. The recent national elections that concluded on 1 June were rife with numerous instances of electoral malpractices, with the Election Commission of India (“ECI”) doing little to check such instances.

Amidst these changes, the BJP has been consistently vying for simultaneous elections to the National Legislature (“Lok Sabha”) and Legislative Assemblies of all the States and Union Territories (“State Assemblies”). The promise of “One Nation, One Election” is prominently mentioned in the BJP’s election manifesto. In March 2024, a High-Level Committee titled ‘One Nation, One Election’ constituted by the Government of India submitted a report on the feasibility of holding simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha, State Assemblies, and local bodies. Previously, proposals by the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India Aayog is a policy think tank of the Government of India), the Law Commission of India (“LCI”), the ECI , and the Parliamentary Standing Committee (“PSC”) recommended the introduction of simultaneous elections by using mechanisms like constructive votes of no-confidence and fixed-term legislatures.

The BJP and these institutions have favored this overhaul to enhance administrative efficiency and reduce expenditure. While these justifications seem attractive, there are significant accountability costs associated with the mechanisms proposed to introduce this system. Fifteen opposition parties and numerous scholars have opposed the idea, alleging that such an exercise would undermine parliamentary democracy and federalism. In this blog post, we analyze the implications of such an overhaul by examining the proposed goal of simultaneity of elections and the proposed means of constructive vote and fixed terms separately. At the end, we briefly summarise our proposal for a constitutionally preferable approach.

Impact of frequent elections

When we examine the possible impact of simultaneity on policymaking, voter turnout, electoral violence, administrative disruptions, expenditure, and corruption, it appears that reducing the frequency of elections would alleviate many governance problems associated with frequent elections. The cyclical effect of elections makes the period close to elections the least favorable for policy improvement. There is a great deal of election-year policy manipulation, which specifically targets narrow special interest groups and has little to do with the welfare of the larger sections of voters. Frequent elections lead to the prioritization of such short-term political imperatives, while long-term economic planning and structural reforms are overlooked. Additionally, the requirement of extensive administrative machinery and the uneven imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (a set of rules enforced by the ECI during elections to ensure fairness, including restrictions on government machinery use) in elections also leads to frequent disruptions in policy implementation.

Elections also lead to the eruption of electoral violence as religious and ethnic identity issues are used by political elites to influence voters. Although the issue is a complex one and would require a multifaceted solution, shifting from the current system by reducing the number of elections could reduce the incentives available to political elites to encourage violence, thus curbing such violence to some extent.

Additionally, elections have become an extremely costly affair. The expenditure in the 2024 national elections has been estimated to be around $16.46 billion USD, making it the most expensive electoral event in the world. Reducing the frequency of elections and conducting them simultaneously could reduce corruption as well as transactional expenditure by parties and the cost borne by the government. Conducting elections concurrently could also contribute to increasing voter turnout. Thus, there is a need to shift from the current electoral system.

Mechanisms proposed and their possible effect on accountability

Extension/curtailment of tenures

For the introduction of simultaneous elections, the NITI Aayog suggested a phase-wise synchronization which involves extension/curtailment of the terms of some State Assemblies. The government will continue to function beyond the period for which it has gained legitimacy. Further, a government which has rightfully acquired the right to function until the completion of a fixed term through public mandate would be deprived of this opportunity. The extension and curtailment of tenures of the State Assemblies would violate the autonomy of the States and the basic tenets of parliamentary democracy and federalism.

Constructive vote of no confidence

To achieve a stable cycle of simultaneous elections, the mechanism of constructive vote has been recommended to avoid premature dissolution of legislatures. As opposed to “destructive” votes of no confidence in which the legislature is dissolved without forming a stable government, a “constructive” vote of no confidence ensures that the motion for dissolution is coupled with a motion for confidence in an alternative. Such a vote comes into effect only when a majority suggests an alternative by expressing confidence in a named individual. The dilution of the vote of no-confidence would reduce the requirement for the political executive to maintain the confidence of a legislative majority to stay in power, thereby impacting accountability. A constructive vote could result in an unimpeded reign by a weak government that no longer holds a majority.

Fixed-term legislature

The NITI Aayog recommended fixed terms of the Lok Sabha (federal lower House) and the State Assemblies to maintain electoral cycles. The PSC suggested that early election to the Lok Sabha or the State Assemblies should only be held prior to the expiration of their tenure if a motion for an early election is agreed either by at least two-thirds of the whole House; or if a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative government is confirmed by the House within 14 days. To call for an early election, an agreement of 364 members of the Lok Sabha would be needed. It would be extremely difficult for the opposition parties to call for an early election as they would need the support of the ruling party or coalition to reach that number. On the other hand, it would be easier for the ruling party or coalition to call for early elections, giving them an undue advantage.

Also, a combined reading of this mechanism and the mechanism of constructive vote suggests that a no-confidence motion cannot be moved unless the rest of the parties move a confidence motion simultaneously to form an alternative government. The need for a constructive vote adds a further obstacle to the second mechanism. For the opposition parties, it would in effect work as a rigid system with almost no effective institutional mechanisms to call for an early election. Thus, both mechanisms would benefit the incumbent government. The proposed mechanisms would dilute the ability of a legislature to vote a government out of office, which is one of the defining features of the parliamentary system.

President’s Rule in case of dissolution of the Lok Sabha or the State Assembly

The NITI Aayog proposed that in case of dissolution of the Lok Sabha or State Assembly, if the remainder of the term is not long then the administration will be carried on by the President or Governor, which is similar to the mechanism of President’s Rule. President’s rule can be imposed in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the state where the state government cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The constitutional machinery is said to have failed when all the alternatives are exhausted and there is no other option but to invoke the emergency power as a last resort. In the proposed scheme, this last resort is being invoked to avoid any disturbance in the electoral cycle due to premature dissolution and for the sustenance of a stable cycle of simultaneous elections which cannot be classified as the failure of constitutional machinery. This can be achieved even by the conduct of by-elections. Thus, invoking such a drastic measure, when alternative means are available, is unconstitutional. Further, the potential abuse of such unitary powers has been identified multiple times. Such mechanisms deployed to conveniently avoid by-elections merely for the sustenance of simultaneous elections are likely to destroy the spirit of the Constitution, violating its basic structure.

Apart from those mentioned above, there are other accountability costs associated with the introduction of simultaneous elections in the manner discussed previously. Conducting elections simultaneously might lead to a down-ballot effect where a small regional party will be unable to compete with the glitz and resources of the bigger national party, leading to single-party dominance. There is a possibility of the incumbent party enjoying an unfair advantage because of the resources at their disposal. The political atmosphere in the country, when all elections are taking place simultaneously, would possibly be dominated by the party with the most visibility and resources. This would affect vertical accountability which seeks electoral accountability from the political executive. The mechanisms of constructive vote and fixed terms would diminish the horizontal accountability of the executive where the executive is subjected to the scrutiny of other state institutions including the legislature.

The simultaneity of elections could also lead to an increase in the personalization of politics where elections have started to revolve around leaders and their personalities instead of parties. Election campaigns rely on television and social media, more than ever. Such media inherently focus more on personality and symbolism to reduce the complexity of issues, and less on substance and details. The populist appeal of Prime Minister Modi and the absence of a strong opposition might ultimately benefit the ruling party. Such personalization, coupled with mechanisms like fixed terms and constructive vote, could have significant accountability costs. Simultaneity can be introduced without incurring such accountability costs. A system which adopts simultaneity without the aid of these mechanisms would strike a balance between its gains and costs.

Suggested Model

We propose a model which would facilitate the introduction and sustenance of simultaneous elections, without the aid of the aforementioned mechanisms. The model is based on the concept of variable and flexible terms where the voter knows the length of the tenure of the government before the elections. The tenures would be adapted to synchronize the electoral cycle without extension/curtailment of the mandate of an already elected government. The model lays down measures to sustain the electoral cycle in case of premature dissolution, without disturbing the current framework of ensuring executive accountability towards the legislature.

The model attempts to introduce and continue simultaneous elections in two phases in a five-year electoral cycle, without breaching the constitutionally prescribed maximum term of five years. This significantly reduces any accountability costs which might be associated with having elections only once in five years for the entire country. Approximately half of the states can go to elections together in April–May 2026, i.e. Phase I of the elections, and the remaining half and Lok Sabha elections can be scheduled for October–November 2028, i.e. Phase II. Thus, the first step would be to adjust the tenures in a manner that they end either in 2026, or in 2028. Unlike the models suggested by the LCI and the NITI Aayog, such synchronization is done before the elections, eliminating the need for undermining the mandate given by the people through post facto extension/curtailment of terms. In case of dissolution of the Lok Sabha or State Assembly, we propose that by-elections should be conducted instead of resorting to mechanisms like the imposition of President’s rule, as proposed by the NITI Aayog. This model avoids the possibility of administration of the country or any state by an unelected executive and thus preserves the spirit of parliamentary democracy.

Conclusion

Conducting simultaneous state, local, and federal elections can be a desirable means of reducing the considerable disruptions and disorder caused by frequent elections in a federal system such as India. However, such benefits need to be balanced against the accountability costs they pose. We argue that the means proposed to introduce simultaneous elections in India may make the system more rigid, attack the principles of democracy and federalism, and dilute the basic features of parliamentary democracy. These mechanisms are neither necessary for simultaneous elections, nor would they succeed in achieving stable and efficient governance. We need a constitutionally preferable approach for the introduction and sustenance of simultaneous elections which would achieve the goal without the use of corrosive means. Adopting simultaneous elections in a phased and staggered manner would achieve a balance between the aforementioned costs and benefits.

Eesha Shrotriya is an Assistant Professor at the School of Law, RV University.

Shantanu Pachauri is an Assistant Professor at the School of Law, RV University.

Suggested citation: Eesha Shrotriya and Shantanu Pachauri, ‘A constitutionally preferable approach to conducting simultaneous elections’ IACL-AIDC Blog (18 June 2024) A Constitutionally Preferable Approach to Conducting Simultaneous Elections — IACL-IADC Blog (blog-iacl-aidc.org)