The People, The Court, and Democratic Resilience: The Case of Regional Elections in Indonesia

Ratu Durotun Nafisah

Centre for Asian Legal Studies

The regional election saga in Indonesia 

The gubernatorial election of Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, has caught the attention of both the elites and the wider public. Jakarta, the second world’s most populous city after Tokyo, serves as the largest contributor to the state’s economy. It is often regarded as a launchpad for national leadership and presidential careers. Jakarta thus holds both political and economic significance, making its regional election especially crucial for political elites. In a surprising turn, the official results of 8 December 2024 reveal that a candidate with overwhelming elite support lost to a candidate from a single party, that stands against the ruling coalition. Pramono Anung emerged as the winner of this election with the support of only one party: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). In contrast, his opponent, Ridwan Kamil, was backed by former President Jokowi and newly elected President Prabowo Subianto, and officially endorsed by a huge coalition of 10 major political parties, holding the majority of seats in both the national parliament and provincial legislature.

Behind this unforeseen twist lies a deeper story: public pushback acts as a barrier to elites consolidating power. Scholars attribute Prabowo’s 2024 presidential victory to the mobilization of support and state resources by Jokowi, especially as he was running alongside Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. Indeed, Jokowi increasingly sought to consolidate his power during the second and final terms of his presidency, ending in October 2024. One controversial move includes the co-optation of the Constitutional Court in the 2023 presidential age limit case to enable his son’s vice-presidential candidacy. After securing power in the national election, the Jokowi-Prabowo alliance sought to expand its influence through proxies in regional elections. This plan was initially supported by regional electoral law, which mandates 20 percent of seats or 25 percent of the votes for candidate nominations. As analysts have suspected, this would allow Jokowi and Prabowo to orchestrate a plan to endorse a single candidate in regional elections and block potential contenders, given the super coalition of parties under their belt with over 75 per cent of seats in parliament.

However, this time, the public was able to frustrate the political elite’s plan through their support of a judicial review decision that modified the threshold. For example, in Jakarta, this completely changed the political contestation landscape of the election, which led to an unexpected win for the PDIP. This dynamic demonstrates both the unpredictable nature of the court as a site of democratic struggle in Indonesia’s fragile democracy and the significant role that the public can play in preventing democratic erosion.

The court as a site of struggle

The Indonesian Constitutional Court has been instrumental in the process of Indonesia’s democratic transition and consolidation; yet, the extent to which the court is a reliable agent for safeguarding democracy remains uncertain given the persistence of democratic erosion. The executive and legislature have previously employed several tactics to undermine the court’s independence. Examples include the controversial marriage of the Chief Justice to the President’s sister, the passage of contentious amendments to the Constitutional Court statute arguably designed to secure the loyalty of judges, and the removal of a sitting judge for failure to uphold the interests of the legislature. The 2023 court decision on the presidential age limit has disappointed the public and was observed as a strong sign that the court’s independence had been compromised.

Interestingly, the court’s pendulum seemed to swing back toward democracy, with recent decisions on regional elections being widely defended by the public. This case may represent the dynamics of judicial review in a fragile context, in which the court is not yet fully captured, but continues to serve as a site of power struggle.

On 20 August 2024 the Indonesian Constitutional Court examined the law on regional elections and ruled unconstitutional on the minimum threshold for nominating candidates in regional head elections. The court set a new threshold between 6.5 and 10 per cent, depending on the number of registered voters in the region, without requiring parties to hold regional legislative seats. It imposed a percentage similar to the support requirements for independent candidates, finding no rational basis for imposing higher requirements on political parties. The court held that Article 18(4) of the Indonesian Constitution required democratic regional elections which opened opportunities for all political parties with valid votes to nominate candidates, thus resulting in a diverse pool of choices for the public and minimizing the emergence of a single candidate that could threaten a healthy democratic process.

The court’s decision was widely welcomed to foster competitive elections and avoid concentration of power. This is especially understood in the context of the Jokowi-Prabowo alliance, which ostensibly seeks to diminish any potential challengers and exert significant control over regional governments. However, the day after the Constitutional Court ruling was handed down, the legislature dominated by an oversized ruling coalition quickly proposed changes to the regional election law that overruled this court decision. They argued that, by deciding the threshold for regional elections, the Constitutional Court subverted the law-making role of the legislature. In addition, the legislature sought to overrule another celebrated court decision, which prevented the misuse of age limit requirements that would facilitate the gubernatorial candidacy of Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep.

Why the plan failed

Large-scale demonstrations and protests were instrumental in navigating this institutional battle between the political branches and the Constitutional Court. On 22 August 2024 thousands, including students, activists, and labour groups, protested outside the Indonesian House of Representatives in Jakarta and multiple cities in the country in response to the legislature’s attempt to overturn court decisions. The public reaction on social media was also massive, with over a million posts tagged with #KawalPutusanMK (Safeguard the Constitutional Court Decision) widely shared across the internet. The chilling emergency warning (peringatan darurat), rendered in dark blue, has become a symbol of resistance and is used to signal that Indonesian democracy is in danger, a situation akin to a state of emergency. This movement ultimately pressured the legislature to fully concede to the rulings of the constitutional court and drop the plan to pass the revised law.

The fact that the ruling coalition still dominates the outcome of the 2024 regional elections after the threshold changes may signal broader issues with Indonesia’s democracy, which warrants special investigation. The evaluation of the fairness of particular regional elections also depends on evidence and political dynamics in each region. Nonetheless, public efforts to challenge the dominance of the ruling coalition should not be overlooked. The Jakarta election highlights the profound impact of the social movement in defending the court’s decision. Initially, the Prabowo-Jokowi alliance was suspected of planning the election with only one candidate they endorsed, Ridwan Kamil, or having him run against a ‘token independent candidate’ to make the process appear democratic. However, as a result of this decision, the threshold for Jakarta was reduced to only 7.5% of the votes. This allowed the only arguably opposition party, the PDIP, to nominate its own candidate and even proceed to win the election.

Conclusion

The case of regional elections in Indonesia shows that the public can be a powerful external control over potential democratic erosion by the legislature and compel adherence to the court’s decisions. However, the unpredictability of the court in safeguarding democracy suggests that public scrutiny of any possible erosion by the court is equally warranted. This is especially crucial in light of the potential threats to judicial independence. Further attacks on the court seem imminent with the legislature discussing Constitutional Court bill to that could potentially institutionalize the mechanism to remove ‘disloyal’ judges and modify age limits to eliminate sitting judges deemed critical of the regime.

The judicial review mechanism enjoys presumptive legitimacy as a relatively legal rather than a political mechanism which could obscure the erosion of democracy or make it less obvious. The unique challenges in a fragile context may further complicate the task of discerning whether the court acts as a hero or villain for democracy. In the case of Indonesia, this calls for consideration of the ongoing power struggle, which could shift at any time between democratic and anti-democratic pendulums.

Ratu Durotun Nafisah is a Research Associate at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies, NUS Law.

Suggested citation: Ratu Durotun Nafisan, ‘The People, The Court, and Democratic Resilience: The Case of Regional Elections in Indonesia’ IACL-AIDC Blog (6 February 2025) The People, The Court, and Democratic Resilience: The Case of Regional Elections in Indonesia — IACL-IADC Blog