Balancing Tradition and Constitutionalism in Europe’s Micro Jurisdictions

Elisa Bertolini

Elisa Bertolini is Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.

How do Europe’s tiniest states reconcile centuries-old institutions with the constitutional ideals of modern democracy? The experiences of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino show that scale, identity, and history reshape even the most fundamental doctrines of constitutional design. Their experiences remind us that constitutionalism is not a single model but a spectrum of adaptive practices.

Constitutionalism in a Diminutive Context

The micro jurisdictions of continental Europe share a dual identity: ancient sovereignty and modern vulnerability. Each is a small enclave surrounded by larger powers; each has long sustained distinctive political institutions that pre-date modern constitutionalism. Their stability has depended on continuity, but their survival in a European legal order committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has demanded adaptation.

Small populations, tight social networks, and proximity to powerful neighbors make full transplantation of modern constitutional models impractical. Instead, these polities practice what might be called “guarded openness”: absorbing aspects of European constitutionalism while preserving the institutional core that defines their identity.

Two patterns of reform stand out.

1.                   Reception en bloc: the direct adoption of codified constitutions, as seen in Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco.

2.                   Institutional continuity: gradual modernization within an inherited framework, the path followed by San Marino.

Despite their different routes, all four states continue to revolve around a single dominant branch of government – the monarch or the parliament. This configuration results in a measured, flexible, but incomplete separation of powers.

Four Constitutional Paths

Andorra: A Feudal Co-Princedom Reborn

Andorra’s 1993 Constitution transformed the feudal coprincipality into a sovereign constitutional state. The French President and the Bishop of Urgell remain heads of state, but only as symbols of continuity (arts 43 and 44). Sovereignty now resides with the Andorran people (art 1(3)), and the state operates under a parliamentary model inspired by Spain’s 1978 Constitution. The arrangement preserves historical duality while embedding democratic governance, a pragmatic balance between medieval identity and modern legitimacy.

Liechtenstein: Monarchy Meets Direct Democracy

Liechtenstein’s 1921 Constitution defines sovereignty as shared between prince and the people (art 2), producing an elliptical state with two centers of authority. The 2003 amendments strengthened the prince’s powers to dismiss governments, appoint judges, and veto legislation, yet also confirmed the citizens’ right to abolish the monarchy by referendum (art 113). The result is a distinctive fusion of hereditary rule and participatory democracy, a system where royal prerogative coexists with popular sovereignty through an ongoing constitutional dialogue.

Monaco: Constitutionalism Under the Crown

Monaco’s political architecture reflects enduring monarchical dominance within a formally liberal constitution. Bound historically to France through treaties of protection, Monaco retained the prince as the focal point of executive and legislative power under its 1962 Constitution, later amended in 2002. The Ministre d’État, often a French national, governs under the prince’s authority and is responsible to him alone (art 43; art 50). The elected Conseil National can debate policy but cannot dismiss the government or amend laws freely (art 66). The constitution remains octroyée, i.e. granted from above, and continues to embody a model closer to nineteenth-century liberal monarchy than to modern parliamentarism.

San Marino: The Enduring Republic

Europe’s oldest republic has preserved its medieval institutions through cautious, incremental reform. The Grand and General Council, historically oligarchic, remains the dominant organ of state. The 1974 Declaration of Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles of San Marino Legal System functions as San Marino’s constitution, while the 2002 creation of the Guarantors’ Panel introduced limited constitutional review. The Captains Regent, two co-heads of state serving six-month terms, prevent personal rule but wield little independent power. The system’s strength lies in continuity rather than innovation: the Republic’s ancient mechanisms have been adapted, not replaced.

Separation of Powers on a Human Scale

Diminutive size alters the meaning of the separation of powers. In micro jurisdictions, social proximity blurs the boundaries between state organs. Political élites, officials, and citizens often overlap; personal familiarity replaces formal distance. Legislatures are too small to perform robust oversight, unless they are the dominant constitutional body, and executives depend on overlapping networks of authority.

In Andorra, the Coprinces act as ceremonial figures, while real authority lies with the General Council and the Head of Government, limited to two terms to avoid personalization of power. The Síndic General, presiding over parliament, occupies a pivotal coordinating role, ensuring equilibrium within a micro-parliamentary system.

Liechtenstein achieves balance through its dual sovereignty: the prince’s veto and appointment powers coexist with strong instruments of direct democracy. The relationship between rulers and citizens is less one of competition than of negotiated coexistence, reflecting a constitutional order that values tradition and consent over rigid separation.

Monaco, by contrast, remains centered on the prince. He legislates, governs, and regulates through decrees immune from judicial review. The Conseil National participates in lawmaking but cannot control the executive. Even after the 2002 reforms, the prince remains the embodiment of the state, a constitutional constant rather than one branch among equals.

In San Marino, the imbalance tilts toward the legislature. The Grand and General Council monopolizes political authority, while the Congress of State and the Regency play secondary roles. The Captains Regent, presiding over both legislative and executive functions, unify rather than separate powers. Checks and balances exist largely within the Council, not between institutions, a functional adjustment to the republic’s small scale and consensual culture.

Europe’s Microstates and Global Parallels

The challenges faced by these European micro jurisdictions mirror those of small states worldwide, yet their responses diverge. Postcolonial microstates in the Caribbean and Pacific often imported the Westminster model wholesale, creating what critics call “Westmonster”, a structure dominated by executive power, constrained legislatures, and weak opposition.

By contrast, the European enclaves developed organically, without colonial templates. Their deviations from classical separation of powers are deliberate choices rooted in historical identity, not accidents of transplantation.

Across all micro jurisdictions, three structural conditions recur:

1.                   Constitutional entrenchment of supremacy—as in Monaco’s and Liechtenstein’s empowered monarchies.

2.                   Overlap of personnel, inevitable in small polities where elites hold multiple roles.

3.                   Tiny legislatures, which limit scrutiny and institutional counterbalance.

These are not flaws but functional adaptations. In societies where “everyone knows everyone,” strict separation can destabilize governance. Stability arises instead from informal norms, social cohesion, and respect for tradition.

Rethinking Separation of Powers for Small States

The experience of Europe’s micro jurisdictions compels a reconsideration of how constitutional principles should operate in small states. The classical tripartite model—executive, legislative, and judicial powers in perfect balance—emerged in large, plural societies. In micro polities, it must bend to the realities of intimacy, limited capacity, and deep historical continuity.

Efforts to impose uniform standards in these micro jurisdictions through international organizations, particularly the Council of Europe, have prompted valuable reforms. Yet the most successful innovations—Andorra’s 1993 Constitution, San Marino’s constitutional review mechanism—strengthened legality without undermining tradition. Where reform attempts threaten core identity, they risk eroding legitimacy itself.

A nuanced approach is needed: international standards must be context-sensitive, acknowledging that micro jurisdictions can embody the rule of law in forms that differ from large-state models. The goal should not be uniformity, but equivalence in function, respecting each state’s history and proportion.

Conclusion: The Constitutional Logic of Smallness

Europe’s micro jurisdictions are not miniatures of larger states. They are constitutional ecosystems of their own—stable precisely because they balance tradition, social cohesion, and limited reform. Their experiences remind us that constitutionalism is not a single model but a spectrum of adaptive practices.

In these small polities, the separation of powers is less about division than about proportion. Authority circulates through trust, familiarity, and historical legitimacy rather than through formal distance. Their survival across centuries testifies to the resilience of constitutional arrangements tailored to scale—a lesson worth recalling as global governance increasingly seeks one-size-fits-all solutions.

This blog post is part of the IACL Blog symposium Small State Constitutionalism, which presents some of the key arguments made in chapters of the newly-published edited collection: Elisabeth Perham, Maartje De Visser and Rosalind Dixon (eds) Small State Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2026).

Elisa Bertolini is Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.

Suggested Citation: Elisa Bertolini, ‘Balancing Tradition and Constitutionalism in Europe’s Micro Jurisdictions’ IACL-AIDC Blog (26 February 2026) Balancing Tradition and Constitutionalism in Europe’s Micro Jurisdictions — IACL-IADC Blog