South Africa’s Government of National Unity: Power Sharing in a Fractured Democracy

Nico Steytler

University of the Western Cape

The national and provincial elections in South Africa held on 29 May 2024 heralded a new era in South African politics. After 30 years in power, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority in Parliament with 40% of the national vote, as well as in three provinces it had governed previously. In June, President Cyril Ramaphosa formed a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU), which included nine other political parties, most of them micro-parties, but excluded two major minority parties. The ANC also formed coalition governments in three provinces.

This significant decline in the ANC’s political fortunes raises the question: what is or will be the significance of the GNU for democracy and federalism in South Africa?

This question is raised against the background of the deep divisions fracturing the nation. The 1994 democratic elections saw the end of white political domination and institutionalised race discrimination – apartheid. This system was maintained through an authoritarian government with no regard for the rule of law. With white control of the economy, South Africa had the highest level of economic inequality in the world between the black and white populations. A further division, emphasised and institutionalised during grand-apartheid, was ethnicity within the African community.

Dimensions of democracy

The political settlement between the ANC and the white minority in 1993-94 was captured in the interim Constitution of 1993 and then later refined in the 1996 Constitution. These founding instruments grounded the new nation on different dimensions of democracy.

First, representative democracy was entrenched based on non-racialism and non-sexism. The cornerstone was equality before the law. The right to vote, to form a political party and to stand for elections was entrenched in a constitutional democracy in an expansive bill of civil and political rights. Representative democracy was to be managed by a constitutionally protected independent electoral commission.

Second, vertical democracy was established through the creation of democratically elected provincial legislatures and municipal councils. Provincial governments share power with the national government, although their assigned powers are limited. Provinces were aimed at deepening democracy, bringing government closer to the people, and limiting central powers. They also catered indirectly for ethnic interests. In seven of the nine provinces there is an overlap, but not an alignment, with linguistic/ethnic communities. Local government was given constitutionally enshrined autonomy, forming a firm base of democracy from the bottom up.

Third, representative democracy was built on inclusive democracy. The electoral system at national and provincial levels is based on a strict, party-based proportional representation electoral system. Consequently, any political party (and, from 2024, also individuals) with 0.25 per cent (or even less) of the votes was entitled to a seat in the National Assembly, making the latter representative of the full spectrum of political sentiments. Also, at executive level there was, for an interim period, inclusivity. After the 1994 elections, a Government of National Unity was constitutionally required for the first term of parliament. At the local level, after 2000, power sharing in local councils was also permitted. Typical of federal arrangements, provincial (and local) participation in national law-making is effected through the second house of Parliament, the National Council of Provinces.

Fourth, representative democracy is further complemented by participatory democracy. Communities, interest groups, and individuals have the right to be consulted when their interests are affected by proposed legislation before Parliament, a provincial legislature, or a municipal council. The Constitution provides explicitly that the National Council of Provinces must facilitate public involvement in its legislative processes, and the same obligation applies to provincial legislatures. Through judicial interpretation, this democratic principle also applies to the National Assembly.

The 1996 Constitution thus envisaged a new South African nation based on the achievement of substantive equality over past divisions of race and gender, an enterprise pursued through constitutionalism and the rule of law. Central to constitutionalism lies representative democracy which is responsive to the needs of the people. Although vertical democracy was not stipulated as a founding value of the Constitution (section 1), in the chapters on intergovernmental relations and cooperative government, provinces, and local government, a quasi-federal democracy was established.

Backsliding on democracy and federal arrangements

The oft-used term ‘backsliding on democracy’ refers to the reduction or limiting of any of the dimensions of the envisioned democracy set out above. Did this happen in the first 30 years of democratic governance? The report card is uneven.

First, representative democracy has flourished. National, provincial, and local government elections have been held every five years. The Independent Electoral Commission has produced largely uncontested elections, which on the surface were free and fair as far as voting and the delivery of election results were concerned. However, undemocratic practices on the ground were encountered. The worst example has been the assassinations of local government councillors or candidates in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

The dominance of the ANC nationally and in eight of the nine provinces, as well as in most municipalities, linked with the strict party-list system of proportional representation, has given party bosses considerable power in the selection of party candidates for election. In particular, the dominance of political party hierarchies has shallowed democratic representation at subnational levels. Also, through the slow but sure process of centralising power, the value of subnational governance (and hence democracy) has been reduced.

While the judiciary performed well in ensuring constitutional democracy, the overall object of substantive equality has been evasive. Little progress has been made with reducing poverty, unemployment, and inequality between black and white people. Moreover, corruption and maladministration at all levels of government have undermined the tenets of democratic governance, particularly during the tenure of President Jacob Zuma (2009-2018) and the ensuing ‘state capture’.

In the context of this governance failure, the fractured nation prevails and political mobilisation around the subjects of economy and race is done by an off-shoot of the ANC – the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Most recently political mobilisation around the radical transformation of the economy and the abandonment of constitutionalism is propagated by the latest split from the ANC – the uMkonto weZiswe Party (MKP).

2024 national and provincial elections and the formation of a government of national unity

Although not unexpected, the magnitude of the loss of support for the ANC was surprising. It garnered only 40.2% of the vote, followed by the market-oriented and white-dominated Democratic Alliance (DA) (21.8%), the MKP (14.6%), the EFF (9.5%), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP – a conservative party with a supporter base made up almost exclusively of ethnic Zulus) (3.9 %). The choice of coalition partners for the ANC was between, on the left, the populist EFF and MKP, or on the right the DA, the IFP, and other small parties. President Ramaphosa’s solution was ostensibly to choose neither, but to give an open invitation to all parties to join the ANC in a government of national unity (GNU). Due to the policy incompatibility of minority parties (the DA would not join if the EFF was in the GNU, and vice versa; and the MKP split off because of Ramaphosa’s presidency of the ANC), the ANC struck a deal with the DA (and eight other micro parties).

In the provincial elections, the ANC lost their majority in three provinces (Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape) while the DA continued their rule of the Western Cape. Only in KwaZulu-Natal did the ANC follow the national GNU configuration. In Gauteng, the provincial ANC formed a coalition with the EFF, while in the Northern Cape they formed a coalition with minor parties. The GNU model has also not cascaded down to metropolitan councils where the ANC governs in differently composed coalitions.

Given the different electoral processes for the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which represent the provincial legislatures, the ANC retains its control of the NCOP with five of the nine provincial delegations, resulting for the first time in a non-alignment between the NCOP and the National Assembly.

The possible impact of the GNU on democracy, or will the GNU advance or reduce constitutional democracy?

On the positive side, multi-party representative democracy has been vindicated. Unlike what often happens in Africa – the rigging of elections or the refusal of incumbent governments to accept election results – the ANC, the former liberation movement, accepted the result without demur and set about forming a coalition.

Vertical democracy is likely to be advanced. Both the DA and IFP, strong proponents of devolution, will push the GNU towards devolving more powers to subnational governments, making the latter more important democratic decision-makers. At provincial and local levels, strict party hierarchy has given way to locally decided coalitions, reducing central party control over local decision-making. This is likely also to result in more vigorous debates in provincial legislatures and municipal councils.

The formation of the GNU has also advanced inclusive democracy. 70% of the voters, representing a wide spectrum of policy sentiments, are now represented in the national government. If the GNU is to survive, a culture of compromise is bound to develop. Also, such an ethos of compromise is inevitable in vertical intergovernmental relations; the 12 ministers in the national cabinet who are non-ANC will have to cooperate with ANC counterparts in the provincial executives.

On the negative side, the GNU may also impede democracy. As far as representative democracy is concerned, some voters for opposition parties, now in the GNU, were flummoxed when their party leadership did not keep their election promise never to cooperate with the ANC. Moreover, the coalition agreement was an elite pact, without the support of party members. Also, the ANC, the MKP, and the IFP have placed on the political agenda the advancement of the non-elected traditional leaders. This may have been merely to gain popular rural votes, or it may foreshadow a reduction of representative democracy at the local level in rural areas. 

Even as vertical democracy is advanced by the GNU, the exclusion of the MKP, who won 45% of the vote in KwaZulu-Natal, from the provincial government of unity (formed by the IFP, the ANC and the DA) could make that province politically unstable to the detriment of democratic governance.

The non-inclusion of the MKP and the EFF in the GNU has sharpened the divisions in society of race and ethnicity. The MKP, despite its claims to be a national party, elicited votes mostly from Zulu-speakers in KZN and the neighbouring province of Mpumalanga and in Gauteng. The emergence of a de facto ethnic-based party does not bode well for a polity striving to de-emphasise ethnicity. The EFF’s strong Africanist stance also places further stress on an already fractured nation.

Overall, the GNU is likely to present gains for democracy and federalism, also at subnational level. The key question is however: will the GNU advance substantive equality? Can it, in a short space of time, also make gains in addressing poverty, unemployment, and inequality? Will leaning towards the private sector produce not only economic growth but also inclusive growth? If the GNU does not bring socio-economic success, or if the coalition collapses for any other reason, the ANC’s only other option is joining forces with the MK and the EFF. This will tilt the government towards the radically different economic model of nationalisation. The populism associated particularly with the EFF is not good news for democracy and the MKP’s anti-constitutional stance, advocating parliamentary supremacy, will fundamentally undermine the current constitutional democracy in South Africa.

This blog originates from the international colloquium Federal coalitions and subnational democracy: India, Argentina, South Africa in Eurac Research (10 September 2024) and is part of the blog symposium Federal Coalitions and Subnational Democracy hosted by the IACL Research Group on Constitutionalism and Societal Pluralism: Diversity Governance Compared.

Nico Steytler is Professor Emeritus, Dullah Omar Institute of Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Suggested citation: Nico Steytler, ‘South Africa’s Government of National Unity: Power Sharing in a Fractured Democracy’ IACL-AIDC Blog (14 November 2024) South Africa’s Government of National Unity: Power Sharing in a Fractured Democracy — IACL-IADC Blog