Egypt Under COVID-19: Normalizing Emergency

Eman Muhammad Rashwan

Hamburg University

Cairo University

Many nations around the world declared the state of emergency to face the COVID-19 threat. However, this post claims that the COVID-19 was never dealt with as a severe legal emergency in Egypt, but rather as an occasion to further normalize the state authorities’ performance under emergency laws. To make this claim, I will first briefly explain the emergency status in Egypt before the COVID-19 crisis, then I will explore the Egyptian response to this crisis, and finally I conclude with my concerns and remarks on these actions.

The Emergency Status in Egypt before the COVID-19 Outbreak:

On 28 April 2020, the state of emergency was extended for the twelfth time since 2017 by an executive decree made by President El-Sissi. Egypt has been under a nearly continuous state of emergency since 1981. According to Article 154 of Egypt’s Constitution of 2014, the President has the right to declare a state of emergency for a limited time of up to three months, which is eligible for renewal only once. However, the government circumvents this restriction through renewing the emergency once and then subsequently declaring a new emergency when both the original and extended terms end. Additionally, with a Parliament that has approved nearly all actions by the President, there has not been an exercise of a parliamentary veto on either the declarations or extensions.

The Egyptian Emergency Law, Law no.162 of 1958, which gives broad legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the President, has been amended many times, prior to the current situation. On 6 May 2020, Law no. 22 of 2020  was issued responding to the COVID-19 crisis. The law legalized the PM’s actions, taken on behalf of the President in response to the COVID-19 threat, of banning, restricting, or regulating nearly all the services and authorities of the state. The law now lists these measures as falling within the executive competence to the President. Therefore, the law expands his permanent authorities under the state of emergency. Additionally, the military can now execute the President’s orders within his emergency powers without prior decision by the Justice Ministry. The only reasoning that was given to these amendments is that they are necessary to face the COVID-19 threat, without any further explanation of their relevance, or a social discussion of their necessity.

Measures Taken by the Egyptian State in Response to COVID-19 Outbreak:

As a preliminary response to the COVID-19 threat on 9 March, the Prime Minister (PM), Dr. Mostafa Madbouly, acting in a delegation of the President and according to his instructions, issued Decision No. 606 of 2020, which temporarily banned any activities that “would require large assemblies of citizens or their moving between governorates in large gatherings … until another notification.” Later on 14 March, the PM issued Decision No. 717 of 2020, suspending all the educational activities in the state. The PM’s Decision No. 718 of 2020 followed, suspending the operation of airlines in all Egyptian airports beginning on 19 March for two weeks.

Decision No. 719 of 2020 was delivered concerning the workers in the governmental sectors, reducing the workforce to only vital workers. The PM’s Decision No. 724 of 2020 suspended all cinema and theatre shows until further notice. Then the PM’s Decision No. 739 of 2020 obliged all entities providing entertainment, sales, services, or restaurants to operate only from 7:00 pm to 6:00 am until the end of March. The Decision exempted vital services. Furthermore, the PM’s Decision No. 740 of 2020 also limited the working hours of sports and popular clubs and youth centers within the same time.

Soon after the previous Decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a declaration instructing the judicial bodies to cease their work, except for urgent matters and administrative work. The Parliament has continued to be in session to discuss and issue “the important laws and measures” it has in the schedule, but while taking health-protective measures.

On 24 March, another decision was issued by the Prime Minister extending the curfew, exempting only emergencies and left the evaluation of this emergency to law enforcement officers. Additionally, the Decision suspended public and private transportation during the same time range exempting the vehicles transporting vital goods and suspended public services. It also extended the measures taken in the decisions’ collection referred to earlier either for a definite time or until further notice. The penalties for breaching these measures are prison (which could generally range between 24 hours and 3 years) or/and fine that does not extend 4000 EP (the Egyptian government estimated the average income of the Egyptian citizen in 2018 with 51,400 EP annually), taking into consideration any other sanction in any applicable law.

Later, the PM issued two decisions; No. 852 of 2020 on 8 April, and No. 939 of 2020 on 23 April, to lift some of the limitations on some services while retaining most of the lockdown coverage and slightly changing the timing of the curfew. These decisions were made due to the beginning of Ramadan. The PM said that they hope that after Ramadan they can lift further measures, so life starts to resume and people start living with the new situation until the threat comes to an end. Moreover, the Justice ministry declared the re-opening for selected cases that are believed to be more emergent than others starting 3 May. The head of the State Council also issued the Decision No. 278 of 2020 to resume the operation of its courts partially and gradually starting 9 May. On 8 May, the PM’s Decision No. 1024 of 2020 extended the same previous measures.

The awaited lift of lockdown started with the Supreme Judicial Council Declaration on 12 May, resuming the Courts’ work after Eid (which was expected on 23-27 May). Later, on 17 May, the PM declared more restrictions on all activities and longer hours of curfew before and during Eid. Meanwhile, he also declared that after Eid, starting 30 May, different activities will be gradually resumed, and another lifting of limitations will be taken starting on 15 June, within the state’s plan of “living with the Coronavirus.”  Although the country has been moving towards the peak of the infection numbers to reach 27,536 on 3 June.

On 6 May, the new amendments to the emergency law were ratified by the President after the Parliament passed them upon a proposal by the government. Based on this law, the PM delivered a Decision deferring a wide range of crimes to the security courts.

How did the people respond to these measures?

The different channels of media show limited cooperation from the people. It could be the economic hardships that many Egyptians face mean they cannot afford to stay at home. The State also offers little protection against the abuse of the private sector against its employees; many employees of the private sector performed their work regularly. It could be in significant part due to the Egyptian economy not having registered at all, and then it is out of the state’s control, because it cannot be tracked in the first place that the informal economic sector in Egypt is huge, i.e., many of the entities are not registered by the competent authorities, which makes it nearly impossible to track and control their operation. It could be Egyptian culture, which is intrinsically against social distancing, or the fact that compared to other countries Egypt had a low record of infections and deaths, so the people did not take the situation that seriously. There are competitive theses that could be complementary.

My argument is that the Egyptian response to the COVID-19 was just an investment by authorities to root the emergency legal status in the permanent life of Egyptians, not to face the threat of COVID-19 itself. though, is that the COVID-19 was never dealt with as a severe legal emergency in Egypt, but rather as an occasion to further normalize the state authorities’ performance under emergency laws. Evidence is that with the courts suspended, none of the arrested violators were referred to a tribunal. Consequently, there are - so far - no applied punishments either through fines or with imprisonment. Egyptian prosecutors, however, said that they have daily cases of breaking the lockdown. However, the instructions they have is to do the reports without referring them to tribunal yet and avoiding unnecessary imprisonment. These instructions could be justified with the effort to limit the virus spread in prisons; however, deterring the breach of lockdown could be achieved by applying instant fines or seizing the vehicle or property used to violate lockdown rules. Moreover, the number of these reports has not been released. Expectations are that a decision will be taken regarding all the violations reports after the current status ends, which will be more or less according to a political policy rather than a pure legal enforcement.

Concluding Remarks:

It is indeed too early to give reliable conclusions based on thorough empirical research about how the COVID-19 crisis influenced the rule of law, human rights, and separation of powers in Egypt. However, I have some preliminary observations regarding the Egyptian state policies towards the crisis from a constitutional perspective.

First, there is a tendency towards the centralization of power. Although the 2014 constitution promises decentralization policies, six years after its adoption, municipalities are still not elected because of the lack of municipalities law  in violation of the Constitution. In such a bio-crisis, in the absence of municipal law and elected municipalities, we see the current governors only in the shadow of the President. They were merely enforcers of his orders and policies, with no elected authorities to monitor, advise, or tailor their strategies up to each governorate circumstances and needs.

Second, this centralization is boosted by a media (which has been monopolized by government connected figures) supported the impression of paternalism. The image being portrayed by the media is that the authorities are doing better than expected, while it is the people who do not oblige with health measures. An image that disregards how far the state is committed to applying the laws to deter violators and protect vulnerable citizens.

Third, just in harmony with the broad drafting of emergency law, some of the decisions taken by the PM used broad and ambiguous language. This gives the competent authorities the ability to deprive any citizen of their rights. For example in Decisions No. 606 which does not constitute clear qualifications (like number of participants) for the banned events or assemblies, and No.719 which gives the employers in the governmental sectors broad discretionary power to decide whether their employees can benefit from the paid leaves and limits on workload during the pandemic.

Fourth, the two opposed policies of gradually lifting the anti-Corona measures and starting the “living with the Coronavirus” policy, while giving new and more centralised powers to the President and the military to face the pandemic and enforce abnormal legal measures, represent a paradox. This paradox supports though the thesis that COVID-19 was only one further occasion to provide the emergency state with deeper and more permanent roots in the Egyptian life, than what it already has.

Eman Muhammad Rashwan is a PhD Candidate at Hamburg University and Lecturer of Public Law at Cairo University

Suggested citation: Eman Muhammad Rashwan, ‘Egypt Under COVID-19: Normalizing Emergency’ IACL-IADC Blog (14 July 2020) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/7/14/egypt-under-covid-19-normalizing-emergency