Using Shifting Narratives to Undermine Gender Equality: Comparative Insights from Hungary, Poland and Turkey

Agnıeszca BIEN KACALA.jpg

Agnieszka Bień-Kacała

Nicolaus Copernicus University

‘Gender’ seems to be a word that, in the imagination of populists, allows them to push their agenda. Moreover, this word stokes the fury of populists and ignites a defense of nationalistic, conservative, religious ‘values’ and constitutional identity. These insights are the primary impressions I got from chairing a panel recently, at the University of Texas’ Global Summit. The panel was titled the Populist Challenge to the Istanbul Convention: The Cases of Hungary, Poland and Turkey and took place in January 2021. This post discusses further insights from comparing the challenges mounted against the Istanbul Convention by these three countries. 

‘Gender’ is also a significant, broad and world-wide subject of constitutional research. Populist sensitivity to this term, however, has led many newly established local and country research groups to shift their constitutional interest to ‘women’ instead.

In this context, a question arises about researchers’ and academics’ duty to engage in informative and meaningful discourse. Ensuring such a discussion level is not easy because while all gender considerations need to be addressed adequately, this must happen without participants becoming emotionally engaged or frustrated. Talks need to remain unemotional because any show of emotion might well provoke populists into further undermining the cause of those affected – like challenging the Istanbul Convention (the IC).    

Ten years ago, when the IC opened for signature (in May 2011), and in the years that followed – including when it was ratified by Turkey in 2012, and signed by Hungary in 2014 – there was little objection to the idea that violence against women and domestic violence need to be combated and prevented. ‘Gender’ as a socially constructed role did not, generally, provoke an intense reaction from politicians, social groups or individuals. When Poland ratified the Convention in 2015, however, a shift had started to take place. This shift was fuelled by populists, calling for pride in a conservative, traditional and hierarchic vision of the world in which men, women, family and country each have particular societal roles. The ideal they advance is not favourable to women, certainly not to women’s individual development and happiness.  

In the context of this growing populist opposition to women’s rights and protection, Hungary still has not ratified the IC at the beginning of 2021. Additionally, the IC faces criticism from various bodies and societal groups within Hungary, Poland and Turkey. The Polish government is challenging the constitutional compatibility of the IC before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Turkey is also pushing its political agenda in the opposite direction to what it was ten years ago. These actions are lowering the level of equality between men and women.        

Despite many structural differences, both Hungary and Poland display illiberal constitutionalist traits, and Turkey has been classified as a competitive authoritarian country. Populists govern all three of these countries, and, in each, the leaders present the populace as a homogenous group with similar views threatened by an ‘other’ with different opinions. Political opponents, the LGBTQI+ community and, ultimately, women are the groups that these leaders hold up as comprising the ‘other’. While these officials seem to sincerely subscribe to a conservative, traditional and hierarchical vision of the world, they also seem to use the concept for personal gain.  

The Polish and Turkish examples suggest that religion plays an important role in the development of a conservative societal vision that undermines respect for and the autonomy of women. In both countries, leaders rely on faiths that espouse a strict division between women and men’s social roles and intrinsic value. The Hungarian example, however, overturns this assumption. In Hungary, similar arguments are made for conservative societal structures (appeals to which are, in turn, also relied on to garner political support), even though Hungary is not a particularly religious country.   

Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish populists have realized that they can use the IC to mobilize voters. They use various legal and non-legal tools to achieve their goals – their most powerful non-legal tools are political communication, political narration, and state-organized propaganda (through state-owned media). The narratives they reinforce using state media include messages like: our country has solved all its problems; women are free here, within their homes, and while they may work, it is preferable that they prioritize procreation; there is no violence against women, other than some domestic violence which the state can successfully counter through the introduction of more extreme penalties; and state action should respect traditional family ‘values’ (including predestined hierarchical positions) and the ‘right’ to these. These slogans create an unfavourable environment for women’s rights, equality as between men and women, individual development and personal freedom. 

Additionally, populists abuse legitimate legal tools, international ones (like denunciation and late reservation) and national ones (like constitutional court motions) to backtrack on previous international commitments. This allows them to maintain and strengthen their power locally. A prime example is the delay of Hungary’s ratification of the IC, which it signed years ago. However, such legal measures are abuses of these tools, not legally justifiable actions. Their effects ought not to be regarded as binding, given that their employment is indefensible as the factual situations have not changed. What has changed is populist demand only. Populists have broadened the scope of groups they target for support and adjusted some of their rhetoric, including increasing criticism of the IC.  

Commentators expect that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (the CT), captured by populists, will deliver a judgement in the constitutional challenge mentioned above, that will be useful to the populist government. The CT is likely to find the IC does not conform with the Polish Constitution; the government will then be able to use the judgment to withdraw from the IC. However, popular support for something like this can change from moment to moment, as happened in Poland, concerning abortion. In Poland, the CT had been abusively activated by populists to deliver a politically favorable decision, but after protests erupted, the populist government delayed publishing the decision for three months. The publication of the controversial CT decision again mobilized the masses, leading to more protests. The Polish case shows the twisted logic of populists and demonstrates how they adjust narratives and arguments based on current public sentiments.   

The populist narrative is, thus, flexible. When the public criticizes specific arguments, they are reframed to fit within current political interests. These politicians then advance their agenda under the banner of a different cause, always presenting it as an urgent matter. These changes could take place over several years, as demonstrated by Hungary’s failure to ratify the IC six years after signing it. Other times the shift can take place over a matter of only some days, like in the Polish abortion case. In Turkey too, the arguments relied on changed, within the populist majority. The populists exchanged, over a ten-year period, calls for equality between men and women for calls for the traditional dependency of women. 

While this post has focused on insights from a comparison of Hungary, Poland and Turkey, other posts in this symposium will consider these cases individually. In these posts, the authors will share more details on the specific situations, actions undertaken, populist arguments and attitudes prevalent in these jurisdictions. 

Agnieszka Bień-Kacała is Professor of Constitutional Law at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. 

Suggested Citation: Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, ‘Using Shifting Narratives to Undermine Gender Equality: Comparative Insights from Hungary, Poland and Turkey’ IACL-AIDC Blog (4 February 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/gender/2021/2/4/using-shifting-narratives-to-undermine-gender-equality-comparative-insights-from-hungary-poland-and-turkey.