The Content of the 2020 Constitutional Amendments in Russia

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Sergei Belov

St. Petersburg State University

In this post, I present the substance of the Russian constitutional amendments, focusing on those which attracted the most attention within Russian society – both among legal experts and in public forums, such as social and mainstream media.

Zeroing Putin’s Presidential Terms

From the political point of view, the most significant amendment of 2020 in Russia concerned the ban against a person taking the post of the President for more than two consecutive terms, established in Art. 81 (3) of the Constitution. In the initial project on amendments, the only change was the exclusion of the word “podryad” (‘in succession’), which was intended to provide a restriction on a person being elected for a third term, even after an intermission for a term of another person’s presidency.

Vladimir Putin was elected as Russian President in 2000 and 2004, then in 2008-2012 he had an intermission (keeping the post of Prime Minister) during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency term. This enabled Putin to be elected again in 2012 and later in 2018. The rule initially proposed worsened the position of both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, who lost the right to be elected as president for non-consecutive terms. Moreover, along with the absence of transitional provisions in the initial bill, the new norm literally required Putin to end his presidency immediately before the end of his term. This is because the Constitution did not prevent the ability to be elected, but rather, “to hold the office of the President” for more than two terms in a lifetime. Nevertheless, this question was not subject to debate during the first weeks of Parliament, and little attention was paid to it until the latter stages of the parliamentary hearings on the amendments.

Later in the parliamentary hearing of the bill, MP Valentina Tereshkova (the first female cosmonaut aged 83) suggested a transitional provision for the new rule, excluding its application to those holding the office of President at the moment of its enactment or before. This transitional provision went further to avoid pre-term residing of Putin before 2024, by zeroing all previous terms of Putin. This gave him the right to appear in the ballot on the presidential elections 2024 and 2030.

This amendment became the bugbear of the constitutional reforms in Russia. The opposition declared this amendment as the actual reason for the other amendments, reflecting the authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin and his eagerness to keep his position after 2024, when his current presidential term will end. The opponents convicted Putin in conservation of the political regime. Some legal experts argued that zeroing of the terms breaches “the legal principle of compulsory replacement of government”. Assessments of this kind appeared early in this blog (see here and here).

Redistribution of Powers between the President and Parliament

The amendments of 2020 sought to raise the significance of the federal Parliament in the system of government. The lower chamber, the State Duma, acquired the power to approve the Prime Minister and all members of the Government (except for the Security Ministers – Internal Affairs, Defense, Justice, etc., who are appointed by the President after consultations with the Upper Chamber, Council of Federation). Before the adoption of the Constitutional Amendments, the State Duma only gave consent to the President for the appointment of Prime Minister. Formal appointment of all members of government was still reserved for the President, as well as dismissal of both the Government as a whole, or its members.

Reform of the Constitutional Court

Before the Constitutional Amendments, the Russian Constitutional Court engaged solely in ex post-facto (i.e. for the laws entered in force) constitutional review. Following the Amendments, the Court was granted powers of preliminary review (applicable to both federal and regional laws), however this power rests solely on the request of the President prior to their promulgation. This combination of preliminary and consecutive review has raised many theoretical and practical issues, though they are still speculative at this early stage. The number of justices in the Court was decreased from 19 to 11. Exhausting legal remedies is now a prerequisite for individuals appealing to the Court with constitutional complaints. Prior to the Amendments, a constitutional complaint could constitute a violation of constitutional rights by a law only. However, following the Amendments, an individual can complain of violation of her rights by any federal legal normative act, including a decree of the President, enactments of the Government and Federal Ministers and agencies.

The power of the Constitutional Court to issue a binding constitutional interpretation of laws was included in the Constitution, as well as the power of the Supreme Court to issue instructions (raz’iasnenia) for courts on the interpretation of statutes.

Some amendments had an indirect effect. Within the package of legislative changes to enact the constitutional amendments, the Constitutional and Charter Courts in the federation (courts established for the review of regional legislative compliance with regional constitutions and charters, similar to Landesverfassungsgericht in Germany) were abolished. These courts had significance in national republics, but not in other Russian regions. These republics were also affected by the new position afforded to the Russian language, mentioned below.

Other Restrictions to State Officials

A block of amendments established a ban on the taking of posts by state officials (the President, MPs, ministers, judges, regional governors, procurators, ombudsmen) who have foreign citizenship or a residence permit abroad. The post of the President was closed for those who had ever held such citizenship or permit. The same officials are not allowed to have bank accounts or keep money in banks outside Russia. The ban on foreign citizenship and resident permits was established in the federal legislation prior to the amendments, yet now have constitutional status.

Ideology and Policies

The amendments establishing ideological, political and values provisions became a matter of intensive debates, in contrast to much of the other issues raised by the Amendments. These provisions concern a wide range of issues, including:

(a) declaration of the succession of Russia to the USSR (never legally declared and raising inter alia questions of compensation by Russia for damage caused by Soviet regimes, in addition to questions of membership in international organizations), as well as respect to the succession in the state development per se and “historically formed state integrity”. This banned any secession of regions or territorial concessions;

(b) mention of “trust in God, transferred by ancestors” (which provoked a strong critique of non-compliance with the principle of secular state);

(c) revering the Fatherland defender’s memory and protection of the historical truth (to oppose the European convictions of the USSR as one of the initiators of World War II);

(d) announcement of children to be the most important priority of state policy with a focus on family upbringing (leaving the door open for reforms to the juvenile justice system);

(e) re-positioning the Russian language from a national language to “the language of the state-forming nation, being a part of multi-national union of equal nations of Russia”;

(f) including in the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation “protection of the institution of wedlock as a union between a man and a woman”, that preserved the value of traditional family in opposition to the rights of sexual minorities.

International Law and Courts in the Russian Legal System

There are two articles in the Constitution concerning international law: the general provisions in Art. 15, establishing that international law is a part of the Russian legal system and that international treaties in Russia have a priority over national legislation (but not over the Constitution). The other clause – Art. 79 – previously read: “The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and may transfer to them a part of its powers according to the international treaties , provided this does not lead to a limitation of rights and freedoms, and does not contradict the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation”. This provision was supplemented in 2020 with a phrase which reads: “Decisions of interstate organs, made on the basis of international treaties of the Russian Federation in their interpretation, contradicting the Russian Constitution, are not executed in the Russian Federation”. Though the change was much closer to the regulation of the participation of Russia in international and supranational unions, as opposed to the regulation of the position of international law in Russia, its opponents argue that it promotes the subordination of international law to Russian national law. This question is a matter of principle established in Art. 15, therefore the change required revision of the Constitution. The norm appeared in amendment to Art. 79, announced in a 2015 judgment of the Constitutional Court. In the same year, the Constitutional Court acquired the power to make assessments if a decision of an international court contradicts the Russian Constitution, such that the Constitutional change embodied this position.

United System of Public Power

Finally, the Amendments introduced the constitutional idea of a united system of government, encompassing the system of both the state and local self-government, which is separated from the state according to a basic principle established in the First Chapter of the Constitution. The notion of the united public power appeared many times in the judgments of the Constitutional Court, but its appearance in the Constitution generated anxiety surrounding the potential use of the provision for strengthening the “power vertical”, squeezing the autonomy of local power structures.

Another concern related to the new institution of federal territories, which has never previously existed in Russia, and could be organized only on territories of some regions. Consent from the regions is not required, so the autonomy of the subjects to the Russian Federation was limited.

Other amendments were also significant (constitutional status of State Council, new procedures for liability of judges, etc.), but their content and consequences will be revealed in their application, which we will continue to follow.

Sergei Belov is Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Chair of Constitutional Law Department, and Dean of the Law Faculty, St. Petersburg State University, Russia.

Suggested Citation: Sergei Belov, ‘The Content of the 2020 Constitutional Amendments in Russia’ IACL-AIDC Blog (1 April 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-1/2021/04/01-constitutional-amendments-in-russia-content.