Well-Designed Semi-Parliamentarism: A Comment on Khaitan’s Defence of Moderated Parliamentarism

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Steffen Ganghof

University of Potsdam

Tarunabh Khaitan (2021) has written an excellent and rich contribution to an important interdisciplinary debate on democracy’s constitutional design. While some of his preferred design choices are close to what we find in Australia, others are original and bold. I think we need more work of this kind. It is a pleasure to comment on it.  

There is much agreement between us. Khaitan grounds his ‘moderated parliamentarism’ in the concept of ‘semi-parliamentary government’ (Ganghof 2018), and he focuses on those variants of semi-parliamentarism I have highlighted and explored in my work, featuring some of the same arguments (Ganghof 2014, 2015; Ganghof et al. 2018). It seems most productive, therefore, to focus on some selected areas of disagreement. Since I recently finished a book that compares semi-parliamentarism to other forms of government, I will refer to the chapters in which my points are elaborated on (Ganghof 2021). 

Is Well-Designed Semi-Parliamentarism Superior? To What?    

Khaitan suggests that semi-parliamentarism is superior to both pure forms of government. I agree that it is, in general, superior to presidentialism. When we go through all arguments that have been made for the latter, we can see that semi-parliamentarism can achieve the respective goals just as well or better (chapter 9). It can often achieve them better because it avoids the perils of vesting constitutional power in a single human being and the downsides of the constitutional safeguards meant to protect against these perils. Examples of these safeguards include presidential term limits (which, ironically, protect democracy by weakening electoral accountability) and the impossibility of assembly dissolution (which denies the government a way to resolve deadlock and counteract an obstructionist assembly).  

By contrast, I do not think we know enough to say that semi-parliamentarism is superior to pure parliamentarism. To make a fair comparison, we also have to consider the strengths of well-designed parliamentarism and the potential weaknesses of semi-parliamentarism. An example of the former is that when several parties participate in the cabinet as ‘veto players’ under pure parliamentarism, they can build executive expertise within their organisations, create trust between (polarised) voter groups, reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and facilitate agreement by allowing for multidimensional logrolls (chapters 5 & 6). A potential weakness of semi-parliamentarism results from the separation of powers. Many of the trade-offs that pure parliamentary systems face in the design of electoral systems and executive-legislative relations (investiture, confidence and assembly dissolution rules) resurface in the design of inter-branch relations under semi-parliamentarism (chapter 8). Finding the right balance between executive dominance and assembly obstructionism is tricky under any executive format.  

Should the Second Chamber Have Less Legitimacy?  

Khaitan argues that the legitimacy of the second chamber must not be equal to that of the first chamber to avoid a ‘legitimacy tie’ and keep the second chamber from usurping a confidence-supplying role. Partly for this reason, he prefers longer second chamber terms and staggered elections. By contrast, I think that the problem of legitimacy ties is often ill-defined and somewhat exaggerated and that factors other than legitimacy, such as budgetary and electoral rules, tend to be more important for whether a second chamber oversteps its constitutional authority (chapters 3 & 7). I also believe that a second chamber whose legitimacy is (at least) equal to that of the first may be quite attractive (chapters 3 & 8).  

Veto power is a good example. When existing bicameral systems weaken the veto power of one chamber to avoid deadlock, it is invariably the second chamber. The reason is its lack of equal legitimacy. Under presidentialism, by contrast, the equal legitimacy of the assembly makes it possible to weaken the president’s veto power. Analogously, if the second chamber has (at least) equal legitimacy under semi-parliamentarism, weakening the veto power of the first chamber becomes an option. This weakening can be compensated by giving the government and/or its first chamber majority strong agenda and/or dissolution powers (chapter 8). Well-functioning minority governments in parliamentary systems, such as those in Denmark, do not have veto power either, but they tend to have strong agenda and/or dissolution powers.  

It seems that Khaitan wants to avoid making the overall legislative process supermajoritarian, but he provides no theoretical analysis of how, and to what extent, this goal can be achieved under the rules he favours. I worry that he is too sanguine about the rarity and resolvability of legislative deadlock under these rules. I believe, partly on egalitarian grounds (chapter 4), that well-designed semi-parliamentarism should try to reap the benefits of powers-separation without making the legislative system supermajoritarian. Weakening the veto power of the first chamber might be an element of such a design, which is one reason why second chamber legitimacy is important (chapter 8).  

Another way to resolve deadlock in a majoritarian manner is to subject a deadlocked bill to a referendum, as is possible in the Australian state of New South Wales. Even if such a deadlock referendum is used infrequently, its availability may render the chamber whose preference is farther away from the median voter more compromising. If the second chamber has equal legitimacy, it can also be an agenda-setter in the referendum process (chapter 8). 

Electoral Design  

Khaitan prefers the first chamber to be elected in single-seat districts. He thinks local representatives create a closer connection between parties and voters. By contrast, I believe that the real-world consequences of single-seat districts are overwhelmingly negative and that their tendency to manufacture two-party systems (at the systemic rather than district level) and one-party governments is easily exaggerated (chapter 5).  

Under pure parliamentarism, local representation in single-seat districts might be needed as a counterweight to the centralised power of the (majority) party leadership—especially when single-seat districts succeed in reducing the number of parliamentary parties. Under well-designed semi-parliamentarism, by contrast, the main institutional counterweight comes in the form of fair multi-party representation in the constitutionally separated second chamber. This makes it possible to mimic the strengths of presidential systems by electing the first chamber in a single jurisdiction-wide district with a ranked-choice or runoff system (chapter 8). This would guarantee that no more than two parties enter the confidence chamber and that voters can fairly and directly authorise a single party to form the government. It would also make it less likely that the opposition party in this chamber gains no or only a few seats, as has recently happened in the Australian state of Western Australia. If local and/or personal representation is considered necessary, it might better be combined with proportional representation and placed in the (democratically legitimate) second chamber. Since this chamber does not need to supply confidence, local and/or personal representation would be less constrained by the requirements of the confidence relationship. 

Khaitan also suggests that semi-parliamentary government is ‘particularly apt at making a party system optimal’. I find this statement ambiguous. Of course, semi-parliamentarism is a distinct approach to ‘mixing’ majoritarian and proportional electoral systems (Ganghof 2016), but — as I argued above — it is not clear that this type of mixing is all-things-considered superior to electoral system optimisation under pure parliamentarism. Moreover, I think that part of semi-parliamentarism’s appeal is that it allows for greater mechanical proportionality and hence a more fragmented and multidimensional party system, everything else being equal (chapter 6). The need for mechanical disproportionality is reduced (relative to pure parliamentarism) because not every party that wins parliamentary representation automatically gains constitutional power over the survival of the cabinet. Allowing proportionality to be as high as possible is desirable because it realises democratic fairness and achieves ‘bottom-up’ accountability in the form of low entry barriers for new parties (chapters 4 & 5). Moreover, cases like Hungary show how electoral disproportionality can manufacture artificial supermajorities with the power to change the constitution and undermine democracy. By allowing for purer proportionality in the constitutionally separated second chamber, therefore, semi-parliamentarism may help protect democracy against backsliding (chapter 9).  

How rigidly should constitutions restrict party and candidate behaviour? 

Khaitan envisions rather rigid restrictions on parties and candidates. He wants to ban members of the second chamber from entering the cabinet and from ever being elected to the first chamber. I doubt that such restrictions are desirable. One reason is that party systems change, as they should. There is no stable distinction between ‘governance’ parties and single-issue ‘influence’ parties. For example, the German Greens started as the latter but have headed the cabinets of Germany’s third-largest state of Baden-Württemberg since 2011 and are also currently in line to become the largest party at the federal level. When parties grow in the second chamber under semi-parliamentarism, their most talented and experienced personnel should probably not be banned from the first chamber or the government.  

We must also consider the possibility that, even when there is a party with an absolute majority in the confidence chamber, this party might prefer to build a coalition government to create a more stable legislative majority in the second chamber. This has not happened in Australia, but it might happen under different circumstances. Furthermore, it might be an attractive solution. Since the other cabinet parties could not bring down the government, they would not be full-fledged ‘veto players’, but their participation in the cabinet might nevertheless facilitate efficient policy-making (chapter 8). To make these sorts of governing strategies possible, second chamber members should be allowed to enter the cabinet.  

Must Semi-Parliamentarism Be Bicameral?  

Khaitan only discusses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentarism. Yet, once we accept the attractiveness of a second chamber with (at least) equal democratic legitimacy, we can see that full-fledged bicameralism is not necessary. The confidence chamber might be turned into a two-party confidence committee embedded in a proportionally elected legislature (chapter 8).  

Among the potential advantages of such a structure would be that the size of the confidence committee could be determined endogenously, based on the actual behaviour of parties and voters. If the first-preference vote shares of the two top parties are small, the relative size of the confidence committee will also be reduced. By contrast, if these vote shares are large, or if parties manage to build two competing multi-party alliances before the election, the relative size of the confidence committee increases (for details, see chapter 8). In this way, the parties that join a pre-electoral coalition for a prime ministerial candidate would not lose their power over the chief executive after a successful election.   

Steffen Ganghof is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Potsdam, Germany.  

Suggested Citation: Steffen Ganghof, ‘Well-Designed Semi-Parliamentarism: A Comment on Khaitan’s Defence of Moderated Parliamentarism’ IACL-AIDC Blog (18 May 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/workshop-my-paper/2021/05/18swell-designed-semi-parliamentarism-a-comment-on-khaitans-defence-of-moderated-parliamentarism-kp7xd.