The Autonomy of Gagauzia and its Uneasy Centre-Autonomy Relations
/Almost 30 years ago Gagauzia was granted a special legal status. Gagauzia is a region in southern Moldova that is home to more than 134,000 Christian Orthodox Turkic people (the Gagauz people), with Gagauz and Russian as the main spoken languages. The territorial autonomy of Gagauzia (Gagauz autonomy) is a rare case of non-violent ethnic conflict regulation in the post-Soviet space. It is based on ethnicity and the perils of flexible institutional design. This post highlights the nature of the legal entrenchment of the Autonomous Territorial Unit Gagauzia (also known as Gagauz Yeri) and the uneasy centre-autonomy relations.
Institutional framework
Following the declaration of independence on 27 August 1991, Moldova substituted the old Soviet Constitution of 1978 by adopting the 1994 Constitution that introduced a mixed parliamentary-presidential political system with a unicameral Parliament (101 members) and a President. Both the Parliament and the President are directly elected for a four-year period, resulting in a dual executive with the Prime Minister being appointed by the President after the Minister and his or her cabinet have received a vote of confidence from the parliamentary majority, and the President having special powers in defence and foreign policy. Moldova’s local public administration system consists of districts and municipalities, and Gagauzia as a special region. Although not the subject of this post, the status of the breakaway Transnistrian region, situated between the Dniester/Nistru river and the Ukrainian border, must also be mentioned when referring to the institutional framework of Moldova.
Legal bases
The legal bases of Gagauz autonomy are the Constitution and the 1994 Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Autonomy Law). Both the Constitution and the Autonomy Law were developed with substantial support from the Council of Europe.
The Constitution provided the ground for granting special forms of autonomy to certain geographic areas: Article 111, as adopted in 1994, referred to special forms of autonomy that may be granted to settlements on the left bank of the Dniester/Nistru river, as well as to certain settlements in the south of Moldova, according to special statutes adopted by organic laws. On this basis, the Parliament in 1994 passed the Autonomy Law.
In 2003, the Gagauz autonomy obtained a constitutional guarantee following the amendment of Article 111 of the Constitution. Paragraph 1 of that Article defines Gagauzia as an autonomous unit having a special status that represents a form of self-determination of the Gagauz people, and that shall constitute an integrant and inalienable part of the Republic of Moldova. Article 111 para. 7 refers to the procedure for amending the organic law of the Gagauz autonomy for which the consent of Gagauzia, unlike in the case of the autonomy of the Åland islands, is not needed. Instead, the Autonomy Law may only be amended based on the vote of three-fifths of the elected members of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The constitutional revision of 2003 was preceded by a visit of rapporteurs from the Venice Commission who commented on the draft law. Many of the principles and criteria suggested in the 2002 opinion of the Venice Commission were, however, not taken into account.
Centre-autonomy relations
Having no sound tradition of territorial division of powers, centre-autonomy relations are based on mistrust. As a matter of fact, centre-autonomy relations have been tense since the 1980s, when Moldova was part of the Soviet Union, because of the non-recognition of the Gagauz demand for territorial autonomy.
The weak implementation of the 1994 Autonomy Law has further contributed to making centre-autonomy relations uneasy. Gagauzia rightly laments the diluting of the scope of autonomy due to the non-observation of the special status by national authorities. Indeed, other organic laws affect Gagauz autonomy negatively as newer organic laws have precedence over older ones. Organic laws can be adopted in specific fields (art. 72 para. 3 Constitution) and they shall be passed with the majority vote of the elected members of Parliament, after at least two readings (art. 74 para. 1 Constitution).
Further, the provisions regarding the distribution of powers in the 1994 Autonomy Law are very vague. In essence, the legislative body of Gagauzia, the People’s Assembly (Halk Topluşu), is endowed with the right to adopt so-called local laws (i.e. legislation applicable on the territory of Gagauzia) in the areas of “[…] a. science, education, culture, b. housing management and urban planning, c. health services, physical culture and sports, d. local budget, financial and taxation activities; e. economy and ecology; f. labour relations and social security.” (art. 12 para. 2 Autonomy Law). It also regulates issues regarding the territorial organisation of Gagauzia and has the right to appeal in case national legislation or regulation interferes with the powers of the Gagauz autonomy.
The powers of the People’s Assembly are, however, neither exclusive nor clearly defined, and in the 1994 Autonomy Law no mechanism of managing disputes in the distribution of powers was foreseen. In 2003, the “central control over the observance of the Republic of Moldova legislation” (art. 111 para. 6 Constitution) was introduced and it resulted in the limitation of the scope of Gagauz autonomy. The reinforcement of the requirement of adherence of Gagauz local laws to national legislation - already enshrined in the Autonomy Law (art. 2) - had the same effect.
These limitations have made defective the mechanism of submitting complaints to the Constitutional Court by Gagauz regional authorities in case of infringement of their powers by central authorities. And they have contributed to the shrinking of the scope of autonomy by means of constitutional jurisprudence.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the elections in Gagauzia in spring 2023, centre-autonomy relations have become as tense as never. The more the Moldovan pro-EU government with President Maia Sandu has taken measures to limit Russian influence in the country, the tenser the relations have become. For example, the ban of symbols associated with the Russian aggression sparked intense debates in spring 2022, and the Comrat Appellate Court struck down a law adopted by the People’s Assembly seeking to allow the display of one of the banned symbols. Also, for the first time since the establishment of Gagauz autonomy in 1994, on 19 July 2023 no official representative from Chișinău, the capital of Moldova, was present when Evghenia Guțul, the newly elected governor (Bashkan) of Gagauzia, spoke to the media after her official inauguration ceremony in Comrat in Gagauzia. Diplomatic corps were also not present. The Bashkan, Evghenia Guțul, represents the Shor Party, whose leader Ilan Shor is a convicted fugitive oligarch. On 19 June 2023, the Constitutional Court declared the Shor Party “unconstitutional”. It is important to note that through a Presidential Decree, the Bashkan is appointed as an ex officio member of the national Government. Since Evghenia Guțul officially took office, the Decree has not been signed yet. Also, several legislative amendments affecting the functioning of Gagauz autonomy are contributing to the fact that relations between Chișinău and Comrat have now reached an all-time low.
Dialogue as the way so far, and forward
Many attempts have been made to better institutionalise dialogue between the centre and Gagauzia. Numerous ad hoc joint commissions have been created. Since 2015, the Gagauzia Parliamentary Working Group (PWG), composed of an equal number of representatives of the Parliament and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, is working to ameliorate centre-autonomy relations. It is thanks to the PWG that Gagauzia could, in part, successfully make use of its right to initiate legislation in the Parliament. In fact, almost all draft laws that were submitted by the People’s Assembly and adopted by Parliament were elaborated by the PWG. Of course, the PWG cannot guarantee the adoption of jointly elaborated draft laws. It is a consultative body. But for now, the PWG is the only intergovernmental and multiparty dialogue platform, and research shows that such bodies have proven effective in managing centre-autonomy relations. Rule of law and trust are, however, preconditions. Both are in short supply at all orders of government in Moldova.
Elisabeth Alber is Research Group Leader at the Eurac Research Institute for Comparative Federalism (Italy), a member of the IACL Research Group on Constitutionalism and Societal Pluralism: Diversity Governance Compared, and Lecturer at the University of Innsbruck (Austria).
Elena Cuijuclu is PhD candidate at Moldova State University and senior consultant at UN Human Rights Moldova.
This blog post is a result of a workshop of the network of scholars of territorial autonomy initiated by the Åland Islands Peace Institute. The network first met and discussed ‘The Many Faces of Territorial Autonomy’ at a workshop in Berlin, convened in cooperation with the Finland Institute in Berlin. The blog symposium is hosted by the IACL Research Group on Constitutionalism and Societal Pluralism: Diversity Governance Compared.
Suggested Citation: Elisabeth Alber and Elena Cuijuclu, ‘The Autonomy of Gagauzia and its Uneasy Centre-Autonomy Relations’ IACL-AIDC Blog (19 October 2023) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/territorial-autonomy/2023/10/3/the-autonomy-of-gagauzia-and-its-uneasy-centre-autonomy-relations