The Turkish Constitution of 1921: An Assessment of the “Double Constitution Period”

Nilay Arat and Aslı Topukcu

Kadir Has University

Introduction 

One of the most significant characteristics of the 1921 Constitution period is the presumption among many that the 1876 Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) remained  in force. This blog post aims to set forth the reasons and various effects of the so-called “double-constitution period”, and criticize this presumption. In order to evaluate if there was in fact a “double-constitution period”, three important questions require attention: whether the 1921 Constitution was a constitution in the material sense, whether the 1921 Constitution was a result of a primary constituent power, and whether the successor constitution automatically abolishes its predecessor.  

Disintegration 

Constitutions lay down rules on the establishment and organization of states, governmental bodies and their relations, along with fundamental rights and freedoms. These components also cover the constitution in the material sense. While examining the 1921 Constitution in terms of its material sense, it comprises provisions regarding sovereignty, government system, functions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), and local authorities. However, the legal regime of fundamental rights and freedoms were not enshrined in the 1921 Constitution. Similarly, provisions regarding the judiciary and its function were also absent in the 1921 Constitution. In that sense, it may be asserted that deficiencies in the 1921 Constitution may lead us to question the existence of a material constitution.  

Yet, this situation is hardly surprising considering the circumstances in which the War of Independence (1919-1923) took place. Hence, the 1921 Constitution underlined governmental institutionalization, as it represents an effort to establish independence under occupation, and a new state. The ambition of establishing a new independent state also gave rise for the discussion over primary constituent power. In this context, the TGNA was considered as a “constituent assembly”, as it established a new state and provided rules for the organization of the state. Another significant feature of the TGNA was it being an “assembly holding extraordinary powers”. Against this backdrop, the 1921 Constitution ushered in a new era, that represents a significant break with Ottoman constitutional developments, of which the 1876 Constitution was a significant component. 

Another important issue to be raised would be the resemblance of the era preceding the 1921 Constitution to Hannah Arendt’s conception of constituent power. As such, local assemblies during the Turkish Revolution may be considered similar to Arendt’s council system. Evaluated from such a perspective and starting from its formation period, the 1921 Constitution significantly deviates from the Ottoman constitutional developments and as well as from the 1876 Constitution, in terms of the people’s constituent power at the inception of both constitutions. This could be considered as one of the most significant features of the disintegration of these “two constitutions”.   

Any Kind of Relation?  

As explained above, the two different constitutions are clearly distinct from each other. If so, how can one assert that two distinct constitutions are in force at the same time? Furthermore, was there any relation or bond between them?  

The 1921 Constitution was a new constitution and the first of the Turkish State. It was not simply an amending law of the 1876 Constitution, as it was not created according to the amending procedure of the 1876 Constitution. Although the 1921 Constitution cannot be considered a follow-up of the 1876 Constitution, it certainly benefited from the achievements of Ottoman constitutional developments. However, the distinction has to be made between taking inspiration from the former achievements, and being completely self-reliant. Thus, there existed two separate governments (one in Ankara and the other in Istanbul) with two distinct constitutions, with different legitimate bases. The two governments did not recognize each other, were rooted in different motivations, and certainly had no common ground; thus, the two constitutions ran in parallel. In addition, it has to be mentioned that the 1921 Constitution was, inter alia, entirely different from 1876 Constitution, in terms of the definition of sovereignty, and the characteristics of the legislative and executive bodies. This leads to a deeper disintegration in the sense of unity of the constitution.  

The majority of Turkish scholars of constitutional law considered that there was a “double constitution”, citing some provisions of the 1876 Constitution that remained in use during the 1921 Constitution period. However, no provision in the 1921 Constitution referred to the 1876 Constitution for justification or validity of any of its contents. One of the most significant issues that was regulated under the 1876 Constitution and was maintained in the 1921 Constitution period was the fundamental rights and freedoms, yet these had only legal basis, and no constitutional value. Even if it were possible to defend the argument on the effectiveness of the provisions of the 1876 Constitution regarding the fundamental rights and freedoms, such assertion would only be recognized/approved under the “deconstitutionalization by revolutions” concept, described below. However, under such analysis, provisions of the 1876 Constitution on the fundamental rights and freedoms would be considered only at statutory level.  

However, the discussion here is different, as the focus is on whether or not the former constitution was abolished. In the 1921 Constitution, no provision referred to the 1876 Constitution in any way, whether to its effectiveness or abolition. In fact, there are examples of such references to previous constitutions. For example, the 1958 French Constitution does not incorporate social and economic rights, but refers to those in the 1946 Constitution. In other words, the preamble of the 1958 Constitution explicitly refers to the preamble of the 1946 French Constitution, and brings to an end the effectiveness of its provisions covering civil, political and social rights. The relationship between the 1958 Constitution and 1946 Constitution could be described as complimentary and assuring continuity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to apply the same argument to the case of 1876 Constitution and the 1921 Constitution in Turkey. Hence, the two different constitutions reflect and represent two distinct institutional approaches.  

A counterargument might be raised based on the provision of the 1924 Constitution (Article 104) that abolishes both the 1876 Constitution and 1921 Constitution. This provision could be considered as showing the development of constitutionalism in the era of 1924 Constitution. Thus, the 1924 Constitution was written under the influence of technical constitutionalism, which left no room for legal gaps, unlike the 1921 Constitution, that reflected the needs of extraordinary times (War of Independence). Therefore, Article 104 of the 1924 Constitution could not be considered as supporting the concept of “double-constitution”, as it is clearly guided by the requirements of technical constitutionalism. 

The “double constitution” argument could also be examined in the light of the theory of “deconstitutionalization by revolutions”. According to this theory, constitutions are abolished after revolutions, and the only effective provisions are likely to be those unrelated with state institutions and organizations, and they exist as a statutory provision rather than a constitutional provision. What is allowed to remain in force is the provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms and criminal law principles in general. In other words, provisions of constitutions that are left untouched by revolutions are considered not to be constitutional provisions then, by the effect of revolution. A common example for such under Turkish Law is Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Order (Law No 2324, date 27.10.1980) that entered into force after the 1980 coup d’état, which allows some provisions of the 1961 Constitution to be effective until a new constitution enters into force. 

Examining the 1921 Constitution under these arguments, it is clearly seen that there was no provision similar to those explained above in the French case. On the contrary, the “Provisional Article” (Madde-i Münferide) explicitly articulates that the 1921 Constitution would be effective from the date of its release, without any reference to any former legal instrument, including the 1876 Constitution. Under this scheme, the provisions of the 1876 Constitution would only be acceptable if not in contradiction with the 1921 Constitution, and be effective only at the statutory level. 

Conclusion 

The 1921 Constitution period is often referred as the “double constitution” period by scholars. The majority opinion asserts that both constitutions were effective at the same time; the earlier constitution was in force restrictively, as its provisions were only applicable if not in contradiction with the latter. However, this issue is simply a matter of technical constitutionalism, as referred to above. In sum, it could be asserted that whilst there existed two formal constitutions, in parallel, there existed only one constitution as the embodiment of the spirit that represented the War of Independence, leading to the establishment of a new institutional state, that introduced a new sovereign ideal, namely, the 1921 Constitution. 

Nilay Arat is Associate Professor of Administrative Law at Kadir Has University, Faculty of Law. 

Aslı Topukcu is Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at Kadir Has University, Faculty of Law. 

Suggested Citation: Nilay Arat and Aslı Topukcu, ‘The Turkish Constitution of 1921: An Assessment of the “Double Constitution Period”’ IACL-AIDC Blog (9 March 2021) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/centenary-of-the-turkish-constitution/2021/3/9/the-turkish-constitution-of-1921-an-assessment-of-the-double-constitution-period.