COVID-19, the Media and Political Self-Entrenchment

Antonios Kouroutakis

IE University

The pandemic has disrupted ordinary politics and policies. States, one after another, have relied on emergency frameworks to manage the health exigency. Much ink has been spilled over the risks and the dangers of such emergency provisions. 

On the one hand, concerns have been voiced from a human rights perspective. It is argued that emergency measures unnecessarily and disproportionally infringe human rights.  Furthermore, it is argued that emergency measures enacted on a temporary basis are often renewed so as to become permanent features of the constitutional order.  

On the other hand, concerns are expressed that emergency provisions imperil democratic institutions. The claim is that concentration of powers in the executive and dejuridification might lead to democratic backsliding of the type now seen in Hungary. 

However, less attention has been paid to the use of emergency provisions for political self-entrenchment purposes. This post considers the way COVID-19 has been used as an opportunity for political self-entrenchment, starting with an example from Greece then providing some background theory on political self-entrenchment.

An example from Greece 

Greece successfully contained the spread of the virus during the first wave, in part by executive legislation that shut promptly non-essential businesses and imposed a stay at home order.  

Among the emergency measures adopted, the government was authorized to run an awareness campaign over the pandemic. By executive legislation, private and public radio and TV stations were obliged to air for free awareness messages on how to minimize the spread of the virus. 

Interestingly, with another piece of executive legislation, the government was allowed to derogate from the existing national provisions and to run an additional awareness campaign, this time with payment. However, the latter measure became the source of controversy between the government and the parties of the opposition. The government distributed €20 million to news websites, printed journals and TV and radio stations, without transparency. There was suspicion that the distribution was ‘based on political criteria and whether media were sympathetic towards the government’. 

In the case of Greece, the pandemic gave the government the opportunity to deviate from ordinary procedures and direct money to the media. The government thus created a fertile ground for positive reception of its policies and a hostile ground for the policy proposals of the opposition. In other words, the government captured the media with state funds. In this way, the press, the so-called Fourth Estate in the political system, loses its capacity of advocacy and its ability to control those in government. 

Political self-entrenchment and maladministration of state resources 

In theory, political self-entrenchment takes place when ‘political actors, incumbent politicians, prevailing political parties, and electoral majorities, take advantage of and even abuse their power for self-serving purposes’. As Gardbaum puts it, political self-entrenchment is a political failure and it can take different forms, such as government capture of independent agencies or political process. 

Another expression of political self-entrenchment is the maladministration of state resources. In particular, incumbents who have access to taxpayer-funded resources may manage and transform state resources, such as state owned enterprises and free airtime, into public subsidies. According to a report from the OECD  ‘public subsidies to political parties can take a variety of forms, including tax breaks, free access to public services including airtime, access to public buildings, provision of goods and allocation of financial resources. Considering the impact of resources on political competition the two most important forms of public subsidies are financial support and free airtime.’ 

For instance, in 1975, Nordhaus, in a ground-breaking article, remarked that governments constantly manipulate monetary policy for re-election purposes and proposed ‘to entrust economic policy to persons who will not be tempted by the Sirens of partisan politics.’ This paved the way for the independence of central banks. Nowadays incumbents generally do not have the power to use monetary policy for re-election purposes in a way that harms long-term financial interests.  

In relation to the media, a case that exemplifies the maladministration of state resources is the appointment of directors to the national broadcaster. The most well-known case arose in Italy, where the then Prime Minister Berlusconi, controlled Italy’s top three national TV channels, known as the Mediaset empire, and the national broadcaster, the so-called Radiotelevisione Italiana (Rai). Nowadays, in Hungary, it is argued that after winning the elections, Viktor Orban and his ruling party Fidesz introduced a new law, which gave them control of the public media, and the ability to use this as a platform  for the promotion of governmental policies. The Italian and Hungarian arrangements distort the level playing field among political actors because the air time of the national broadcaster might be used to promote the government. 

Finally, in Israel in 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu was indicted on corruption allegations.  The prosecutor based the charges on allegations that the Prime Minister agreed with Arnon ‘Noni’ Mozes, the owner of one of Israel’s largest newspapers, Yedioth Ahronoth, that the latter would offer more favourable coverage of Netanyahu’s government, in exchange for the former limiting the circulation of a rival newspaper. 

Concluding remarks 

During emergencies, the focus is often human rights violations or collapse of the constitutional order. These are obviously important issues that demand attention, however it is also crucial to attend to emergency measures aiming to promote political self-entrenchment.  

In general, political actors in power are entrusted with the state resources and policies that have direct or indirect financial impacts. Obviously, their role is to administer state resources and policies with the aim of promoting the public good and public interest. However, when incumbents misuse state resources in their favour, turning them into tools with tremendous impact on the political competition they distort the political fair play and the democratic equilibrium.  

The lack of a coherent framework to regulate political self-entrenchment in combination with the well-known practice of deference shown by the courts during emergencies makes this combination a serious threat to the democracies.  But constitutional lawyers do not have to shoot in the dark. There is a plethora of successful tools in order to protect the level playing field and the competition in the market economy that they can draw inspiration from.  

Antonios Kouroutakis is Assistant Professor at IE University. 

Suggested citation: Antonios Kouroutakis, ‘COVID-19, the Media and Political Self-entrenchment’ IACL-AIDC Blog (30 July 2020) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/7/30/covid-19-the-media-and-political-self-entrenchment