The Complexities of Democratic Choice: A Response to Yossi Nehushtan and Ash Murphy
/Yossi Nehushtan and Ash Murphy’s blog post "This is not the people's government or the democratic will of the people" deals with the democratic theory that underlies the Brexit decision, and in particular with the relevance to the Brexit issue of the way in which the existing majoritarian single member plurality rule electoral system in the U.K. works. The authors are opposed to the non-proportionality between party votes and seats that such a system exhibits, in varying degree over time, and to the implications for the quality of U.K. democracy they think follows from this feature of the existing electoral system.
The authors state early on that:
"Democracy is a complex concept entailing various requirements, but one necessary condition for democracy to exist is that its voting system will reflect the majority will (my italics) in a meaningful way – or at least will not completely fail to reflect it. Even if a non-proportional voting system is accepted by the public as 'the rules of the game', that alone does not make it democratically legitimate."
The authors continue on to argue that because of the lack of proportionality in the electoral system, the Brexit decision lacks democratic legitimacy even though it may have followed on from public consent to the process that led to it.
There are complicated issues being raised here. I agree with the authors that democracy is a complex phenomenon. However, most definitions of it that I am aware of do not include reflection of the majority will as one of the defining characteristics of a democratic state, where this will is understood as something organic that is independent of the outcome of a particular electoral contest. (Responsiveness to the changing opinions of various parts of the electorate is a different matter). For example, Adam Przeworski (chp 1) regards democracy as a political system that exhibits three main characteristics: ex ante uncertainty – the contesting parties do not know with certainty what the electoral outcome will be; ex post irreversibility – losers do not try to reverse the results of an election; and repeatability – losing parties go away quietly hoping to win another day. Robert Dahl (p 38), in a figure entitled “What is democracy?”, lists five things that democracy provides for: effective participation; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding; exercising final control over the agenda; and inclusion of adults. These definitions do not refer to the majority will, nor to a specific voting mechanism.
There is a reason why the majority will (or a similar construct) is not usually included in the definition of democracy. It is because preferences of voters and the collective choice process that is used always interact to determine the outcome of any electoral contest. There is no majority will that is independent of the choice process; the same set of individual preferences will lead to a different outcome if we change the voting mechanism. In other words, in a heterogeneous society there is simply no way to define the will of the majority independently of the collective choice process used to reconcile the conflicting demands of citizens.
Here is what Maurice Duverger (p34 of his chapter "Which is the Best Electoral System?" in Lijphart and Grofman eds) had to say about this interdependence of outcomes, collective choice and individual preferences in the context of his discussion of plurality or majority methods as opposed to proportional representation as the basis for an electoral system:
"The basic argument of the PR advocates is that it gives a photographic image of public opinion that is as faithful a likeness as possible. That is true if we compare the vote percentages received by the different parties and their seat percentages. But the distribution of the votes is itself dependent on the country's party system, which in turn depends on the type of electoral system. PR projects as much as it records."
If there is no majority will that stands by itself independently of the electoral system, do the authors' conclusions still follow?
As to the choice between electoral systems, about which I have written at some length on another occasion, I will only say here that I think there is still much to be said in defense of systems (including but not limited to single member plurality rule) that are based on principles of responsibility, as opposed to systems based on principles of representation such as pure or modified PR.
Stanley L. Winer is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Public Policy at Carleton University, School of Public Policy and Administration and Department of Economics, Ottawa
Suggested Citation: Stanley L. Winer, “The Complexities of Democratic Choice: A Response to Yossi Nehushtan and Ash Murphy” IACL-IADC Blog (12 May 2020) https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/5/12/the-complexities-of-democratic-choice-a-response-to-yossi-nehushtan-and-ash-murphy